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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The year 1965 was a turning point in the history of Indonesia. The 
political and economic conditions were severely troubled, as a result of 
the failure of the economic policy of the Soekarno Government. Prior to 
1965, the Soekarno Government implemented the policy of "stand of its own 
feet” (BERDIKARI), which means to fulfill the need for commodities by 
domestic effort, without any foreign aid and foreign investment, especially 
from the West. The attempted coup by the Communist Party in 1965 made the 
condition much more extreme. In that year, the nation was deeply in debt, 
inflation had rocketed to 639%,3 and the political environment was 
increasingly turbulent and uncertain.4 This situation led to the outward 
flight of investment capital. According to the available record, annual 
growth of the Gross Domestic Product for 1965 was less than 2%, exports 
were declining at a rate of 3.5% per year, and imports were increasing by 
3%. Due to the lack of investment, which led in turn to a lack of job 
opportunity, unemployment was also very high over the period 1960-1967. 
The "New Order" government of President Soeharto, which came into full 
power officially in 1967, tried to rescue the country by focusing on 
economic rehabilitation and stabilization. The first step was rejoining 
international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank, and the United Nations after several years of withdrawing from 
such institutions during the Soekarno government. These institutions and 
several developed countries, through a consortium of creditor countries 
called the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), provided 
significant assistance and guidance for improving Indonesia's economic 
condition. In December 1966, the United States, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, France, West Germany, Japan, and Italy, as members of IGGI, 
attended the "Paris Meeting" in Paris to help Indonesia deal with external 
financial pressures, such as the burden of foreign debt. One of the 
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results of that meeting was the rescheduling of the Indonesian foreign 
debt. Moreover, every national policy decision on economic and political 
conditions was then formulated in accordance with the framework designed 
and suggested by the IMF and World Bank.3 Foreign aid and international 
funds were provided by the IMF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
and other national governments. 
The most important step in restructuring the economy was the effort of 
the government to attract foreign investment, which began with the 
enactment of the Foreign Investment Law in January 1967. Foreign 
investment was almost entirely absent in the first twenty years after 
independence due to the hostile attitude of the Soekarno Government towards 
existing foreign property.4 The new law offered a wide range of financial 
incentives for foreign investors, including a reduction or elimination of 
taxes (known as tax holidays), full profits for five years of production, 
and profit repatriation. As a result of this "open door economy," the term 
used by Wirahadikusumah, foreign aid and capital from noncommunist 
countries began to flow in.5 
The new government, known as "Orde Baru," or "New Order," also 
established the cabinet ministry in April 1966 named the "Ampera Cabinet." 
"Ampera" stands for "Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat," which means "mission of 
the people." The Ampera Cabinet introduced certain policies to overcome 
the short-term problems, such as high inflation and stagnation, and the 
provision of adequate food and clothing, including the basic necessities of 
life. The major issues which the new government pursued were the balance 
of payments, the state budget, tight money policy, and decontrol of 
prices.6 
Another important feature of the new government was the implementation 
of five Five-Year Development Plans (called REPELITA, which stands for 
"Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun"), beginning in 1969/1970. These plans 
have been concerned primarily with broad targets and policy emphasis. Each 
plan has a target to achieve a certain increase in annual economic growth, 
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with a particular economic sector, either industry or agriculture, 
specifically emphasized. 
The results of all of these efforts seem to be promising. The 
industrial growth rate of about 11% per annum (in real terms) from 1967 to 
1977 is outstanding, compared to the condition of almost no development of 
industry in the early 1960s. The rate of inflation decreased from over 
639% in 1965 to about 13% in the second period of Five-Year Development 
(1974/1975 - 1978/1979), according to the Ministry of Finance Report 
(1986). 
Statement of Problem 
The most significant feature of Indonesia's economic development after 
1965, as noted above, has been the effort to attract foreign investment. 
Domestic investment also has been encouraged, but the lack of capital made 
the "Orde Baru" government need foreign investment more in the early years 
of its era. 
The need for, and the role of, foreign investment was properly 
described by Mr. Ismail Saleh, acting Chairman of BKPM (the Investment Co¬ 
ordinating Board), in a speech at a Trade and Investment Symposium held in 
London in 1980: 
My message is simple. Indonesia wants, welcomes, needs foreign 
investment. The message has not been lost on the 800 or so investment 
projects undertaken in Indonesia since 1967. If we look at the goals of 
Indonesia's third five-year plan, it is clear why foreign investment has 
a major role to play. The plan envisages an annual economic growth rate 
of not less than 6.5% - a rate we are now exeeding. It envisages a 
substantial level of investment of not less than $68,000 million, 
comprising at least $35,000 million from the state development budget 
and $33,000 million from private investment. To achieve meaningful 
results in a reasonable period of time, we must look for partnerships 
that can provide not only capital resources but also technical skills 
and management know-how. Foreign investment is needed to a greater 
extent than ever before. 
The relationship between Indonesia and the foreign investor is, we 
hope, one of mutual benefit. You have what we need: the capital, the 
sophisticated technology, the management expertise. But Indonesia has 
what you want: potential resources, a large domestic market, a highly 
motivated workforce, and a government which recognizes the importance of 
foreign investment and which is determined to create a favourable 
business environment.7 
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It is clear that Indonesia needed foreign investment as one way to 
cure the economic condition existing before 1965, and will still need 
foreign investment in the future. Mr. Sanyoto Sastrowardoyo, Chairman of 
the Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board, in Newsweek, The Special 
Advertising Supplement: Indonesia: The New Dawn Opportunity. May 1991, 
stated that, besides assisting economic development, foreign investment is 
needed for the inflow of fresh capital, for a transfer of technology and 
know-how, and for learning about marketing the product in the international 
market. 
Indonesia is just one of many developing countries competing for 
foreign investment. Consequently, the investment climate in Indonesia has 
to be more attractive than in other countries. This point was stated by 
Dr. J.B. Sumarlin, who was Minister of State for Administrative Reform and 
Vice-Chairman of Bappenas, the State Planning Agency, in a speech at a 
Trade and Investment Symposium in London in 1980, as follows: 
We recognize that in a number of fields in which we would like to 
see new foreign investment in Indonesia, the investment funds worldwide 
are limited compared with global investment opportunities. We therefore 
recognize that the terms and conditions under which foreign investment 
can take place in Indonesia must remain attractive and competitive when 
compared with terms and conditions elsewhere. We believe our incentives 
are competitive.8 
Is it true that the government always maintains a "favourable business 
environment?" How about the "terms" and "conditions" to make investing in 
Indonesia more attractive than investing in other countries? These are 
among the questions that are examined in this study. The Foreign 
Investment Law of 1967, for example, did not seem to guarantee that the 
inflow of foreign investment was running smoothly after its enactment. The 
restrictive policies that were adopted in 1970, such as certain sectors 
being closed off to new foreign investment, were also considered to be a 
barrier to foreign investment inflow. 
The bureaucratic system in the early years of the "Orde Baru" 
government also did not seem to support the enactment of The Investment 
Law. A number of government ministries were involved in setting the rules 
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and regulations, advising potential foreign investors, and issuing 
licences. This system did not favor foreign investors, due to the 
considerable time consumed for this purpose. As a result, many Western 
companies went next door to build their companies in Malaysia or 
Singapore.9 Those are examples of the policies and regulations that 
inhibited efforts by the government to attract foreign investment. 
Year by year, policies and regulations have been changed. Each of 
these changes has had its own influence on the extent and form of foreign 
investment. The establishment of the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) 
in January 1977, for example, which provided a "one-stop" system to foreign 
investors, was one effort to simplify the procedures for approval of 
proposed investments, and thus was expected to attract more foreign 
investment. However, not all policies and regulations have had a positive 
impact on foreign investors. The Investment Priority List, a regulation 
issued by BKPM, is one example of a regulation that has had a discouraging 
effect on foreign investment. This list, prepared by BKPM and the 
technical departments, such as the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, consists of the list of sectors within the economy which are 
opened or closed for domestic or foreign investment. The purpose of this 
Priority List is to protect domestic investment by closing some particular 
sectors off from foreign investment. In order to obtain approvals of a 
proposed investment project, any particular sector has to be included in 
the list of open sectors. This regulation might be expected to have a 
negative effect on the inflow of foreign investment. 
What determines the "terms" and "conditions" which make foreign 
investment in Indonesia attractive and competitive? One factor that has to 
be taken into account, as explained above, is policy and regulation, or the 
policy environment. This is the most important factor that affects 
directly or indirectly the development of foreign investment. The 
government's policy can affect activity inside the company, the 
establishment of new projects, the marketing of products, and the supply of 
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raw materials to the foreign company. Political and economic stability 
also play an important role in the growth of foreign investment. It is 
difficult for a country with continual riots and high inflation, for 
example, to attract investment. 
Those concerns which are related to government policy and regulation 
are the principal problems analyzed in this study. The purpose of this 
study is to assess the impact of policy and regulation on the development 
of investment in Indonesia in general, and of foreign investment in 
particular. However, the pros and cons of the effect of foreign investment 
on Indonesia are not the subject of this study. The results of this study 
may be used to identify what kinds of policy or regulation related to the 
development of foreign investment are needed, and may provide inputs to the 
government of Indonesia about policy and regulations to encourage foreign 
investment in the future. 
Data on foreign investment in Indonesia are analyzed using time series 
analysis. Among the sectoral data that are available, foreign investment 
data for manufacturing industry were chosen to be analyzed, along with 
other sectors, because this sector absorbs the highest portion of foreign 
investment. The Statistical Analysis System (SAS) computer package is used 
to conduct intervention modelling of the relevant data using time series 
methods following the Box-Jenkins strategy (Box & Jenkins, 1976). 
The chief source of the data is The Financial Report of Bank 
Indonesia. When Investment data for a particular year appear more than 
once in the reports, the latest data value is used. For example, if the 
investment data for 1981 appear both in The Financial Report of 1982 and 
1983, the data values reported in the latest issue, which is the 1983 
report, are used. The 1967, 1968 and 1969 data are quoted from Foreign 
Investment and Industrialization in Indonesia (Hill, 1988), which relied on 
BKPM as its original source. Those data were not found in The Financial 
Report. but most of the data from that book, especially for the 1960s and 
1970s, match the data from The Financial Report. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Government policy is one factor that affects foreign investment. 
However, this factor cannot be separated totally from others which 
influence decisions regarding foreign investment. Therefore, a literature 
review focused on the effect of government policy on foreign investment 
must discuss other aspects of foreign investment. This review of relevant 
literature accordingly integrates discussions of both governmental and non¬ 
governmental influences over foreign investment, concentrating on the Third 
World generally and Indonesia in particular. 
The Definition of Foreign Investment 
According to the definition of the International Monetary Fund, 
foreign investment in a country A, is investment income in A owned by 
residents of other countries. For a country donor, this investment is 
categorized as debits (payments), and for the host country, this investment 
is categorized as credits.1 
Foreign investment itself consists of three types: direct 
investment, portfolio investment, and amortization. Direct investment 
includes the acquisition of stocks or bonds offered by a firm abroad in 
which the investor has an interest and owns physical assets. Portfolio 
investment covers all other stocks and bonds, such as the obligations of 
government, in which the investor does not have a controlling interest. 
Amortization refers to the repurchase or retirement of securities 
previously sold to foreigners. 
For Indonesia, portfolio investment is very small,2 but direct 
investment has been very large since 1966. Therefore, the discussion of 
foreign investment below is couched in terms of foreign direct investment. 
Foreign investment can take place in different forms, such as: 
-Joint ventures, in which two or more entitites establish a new business 
which is arranged by a contractual agreement. 
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-New plants and plant expansions or addition to existing capacity. 
-Equity increases or a rise in the percentage of foreign investor 
ownership. 
The Need For Foreign Investment From The Point of View of 
The Host Country 
Foreign investment can make a valuable contribution to the host 
country.3 One example is in creating or adding saving, according to Paul 
Ellsworth, who presented equations as follows:4 S = Id + If, which means 
that total savings equals the summation of domestic investment and foreign 
investment. It is also the case that, by definition, S - Id = X - M, where 
S = saving, Id = domestic investment, X = exports, and M = imports. This 
equation means that, for a country to participate in international 
investment, savings must exceed domestic investment. Part of total savings 
might be used for domestic investment, while the excess of that might be 
used for foreign balances. Therefore, foreign investment can be used to 
prevent a deficit in the country's balance of payments. 
The most prominent effect of foreign investment is to raise 
productivity and efficiency in the host country. The features of foreign 
investment presented above, together with better management, marketing, 
technology, and organization, can lead indirectly to higher productivity 
and efficiency.5 Consequently, in the host country wages of domestic labor 
could be increased, the price of the product could be decreased, and 
government could obtain a higher level of tax revenue due to increases in 
the income tax and sales tax.6 
The inflow of foreign capital could also lead to more opportunity for 
employment due to new establishments or an expansion of business. As a 
result, the standards of living of the people in the host country could be 
improved.7 Unfortunately, not all foreign investment provides benefits to 
the host country. Besides, foreign investment also has some disadvantages 
to the host country. The added capital supplied by foreign investors might 
result in lower interest rates. This might discourage domestic savers.8 
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Moreover, there might be competition between the domestic investors and the 
foreign investors, which might reduce the sales and the profit of domestic 
companies, due to the lack of capital and lack of technology, management, 
and marketing expertise, compared to foreign companies. Due to this 
reason, in the short run greater foreign investment is not always good for 
the host country.9 However, in the long run, foreign investment may 
benefit the domestic savers, financial businesses, and domestic investors, 
due to faster economic growth. In order for foreign investment to be able 
to play the role that benefits the host country, the host country should 
have a macro-economic framework that supports the development of private- 
sector investment, in general, and foreign investment, in particular.10 
Indonesia as an underdeveloped country in 1965 faced the problem of 
low saving, low domestic investment, low productivity, and low incomes. 
Indonesia also suffered the problem of lack of technology and management 
expertise. Foreign investment, among other sources of support, was needed 
to overcome these problems. However, even though the Indonesian economy 
has been developing rapidly since the 1970s, foreign investment is still 
needed, both because Indonesia still has the problems listed above and in 
order to enable Indonesia to participate in international investment in the 
future. In addition, the oil crisis, in which the price of oil, as one of 
Indonesia's primary exports, decreased, and the subsequent rising 
unemployment rate, are among the problems that cause the need for foreign 
investment. 
From the point of view of the donor countries, it is important to 
ascertain why they place direct investment in the foreign country. To 
answer this question, we turn to recent theories of foreign direct 
investment. Instead of assuming perfectly competitive markets, identical 
production functions in different countries, and international movements of 
capital, as the "pure” theory assumes (in the Heckscher-Ohlin form), the 
more recent theory explains foreign direct investment based on 
"imperfections" from oligopolistic interdependence, and the possession of 
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monopolistic advantages. This oligopolistic theory explains that direct 
foreign investment comes into existence if the foreign firm has some 
monopolistic or oligopolistic advantages in the host country.11 
According to Sanjaya and Streeten (1977), the nature of oligopolistic 
advantages can take the form of: 
- capital: foreign investors may have larger amounts of capital available 
than do local investors, 
- management: foreign firms may have more knowledge and experience, which 
results in higher levels of efficiency compared to local firms, 
- technology: foreign firms usually apply more advanced technology than do 
domestic firms, 
- marketing: foreign investors usually have more experience than do local 
investors in marketing, and 
- economies of scales: the generally larger size of the foreign company's 
plant compared to the domestic company's plant might be the reason for this 
feature.12 
These oligopolistic advantages are necessary conditions for direct 
foreign investment, but do not constitute sufficient conditions.13 Without 
fulfilling these conditions, there is no economic rationale for foreign 
investment to flow into a country. Local firms can simply borrow capital 
abroad if they have the same advantages as foreign firms have. In 
addition, foreign firms need to overcome certain difficulties or 
disadvantages associated with their operation in a foreign country, such as 
difficulties arising from communication, as well as linguistic and cultural 
differences. The set of oligopolistic advantages outlined above are the 
way to overcome those problems.14 
A further step in understanding the cause of direct foreign 
investment is to analyze why foreign firms choose direct investment, rather 
than exporting or licensing the products. The availability of 
oligopolistic advantages does not guarantee that foreign firms will engage 
in direct investment. As we know, many operations abroad have the risk of 
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failure and difficulties, especially for firms without international 
experience. On the surface, it seems that it would be easier for the firms 
to export their products rather than to invest in the foreign country. So, 
why do these firms want to undertake direct investment? Capuraso presented 
some factors that can be considered important in answering this crucial 
question:15 
a. Push Factors. 
This refers to the product cycle, the rising cost of labor, and the 
increasing governmental regulation of business in the home countries of 
multinational companies. Besides, the sharpening competition among 
industrialized countries is also considered to be another push factor for 
foreign companies to invest in developing countries. 
b. Pull Factors. 
Pull factors refers to characteristics specific to host countries that 
attract foreign investment. According to Moran (1978) and Capuraso (1981), 
the following factors are considered to be pull factors for investing in 
the foreign country:16 
- Local Market. 
A country like Indonesia, for example, with 110 million population, is 
expected to have a large local market that attracts foreign 
investment. Lall and Streeten stated that the attractiveness and the 
stability of the market is also considered to influence the decision 
to do direct investment rather than licensing.17 
- Labor Cost. 
Labor cost, which is usually cheaper in the host country compared to 
the home country, is another factor that attracts foreign investors to 
build plants in the other countries rather than exporting goods. 
- Natural Resources. 
A country with abundant natural resources will attract foreign 
investors to locate in that country. Indonesia is one example of a 
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country that might be able to attract foreign investors due to this 
factor. 
- Government Policy. 
The existence of host government policy to restrict imports directly 
or indirectly through a tariff is one of the most important reasons 
why foreign firms choose to engage in direct investment and build the 
plant, rather than exporting goods to a country. However, as Lall and 
Streeten stated, the oligopolistic advantages, as necessary 
conditions, must be fulfilled in order for the foreign firm to invest 
in a country with that kind of policy.18 
Foreign Investment and Government Policy 
The relationship between government policy and foreign investment 
generally refers to government efforts to attract or restrict foreign 
investment. Government policy is needed as a way to balance between the 
cost and benefit of foreign investment and domestic investment in the host 
country.19 Government policy affects foreign investors in their planning 
to invest in a certain country or region. 
Grosse viewed government constraints on foreign direct investment as 
"part of the cost of getting a product to the market, if we use 
international trade theory as the basis of analysis.1,20 Furthermore, 
according to the study of Seev Hirsch (1976), any additional cost resulting 
from government controls on the establishment or operation of a foreign 
firm will discourage foreign investment.21 This argument is parallel with 
the traditional economic scholarship, in which foreign investors are seen, 
according to Lall, as "neutral providers of capital, expertise, and 
technology" and the incorrect policies of the host government can 
discourage foreign investment.22 
Another argument is to see foreign investment and exports as a 
substitute for serving the host market. Formal conditions that justify 
choosing either exports or foreign direct investment to serve the host 
country are as follows: 
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(i) Export to B if: 
1. Pt + M < Pb + K 
and 2. P, + M < Pb + C 
(ii) Invest in B if: 
3. Pb + C < Pt + K 
and 4. Pb + C < P, + M 
In addition, the conditions that justify the choice for licensing are: 
5. Pb + K < P, + M 
and 6. Pb + K < Pb + C 23 
where Pa = cost of production per unit in home country a, 
Pb = cost of production per unit in host country b, 
K = firm-specific information, such as proprietary technology 
and management know-how (valued in cost per unit of output), 
M = export marketing cost minus domestic marketing 
cost (in cost per unit of output), and 
C = additional cost of controlling the operations of an 
international company (in cost per unit of output). 
If 5 and 6 are the case, a firm will be forced out of the market and would 
try to do licensing of proprietary technology or know-how to the domestic 
competitor, at a price lower than K. 
Government regulation will add indirectly more cost of production per 
unit in the host country. As a result, government controls on foreign 
investment will lead to the foreign country preferring export goods over 
building a plant in a host country. 
According to Lall and Streeten, government policies can also control 
the conditions that attract foreign investment, such as:24 
a. providing information in the countries that are expected to be the donor 
countries, and contacts with foreign companies which may be interested in 
investing abroad. 
b. the availability of incentives, for example, fiscal incentives, such as 
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tax structures and rates, and exemptions from customs duties and 
commercial-industrial taxes on imported items essential for setting up the 
plant.25 Other incentives, such as financial assistance and employment 
assistance, are also important in attracting foreign investment. 
According to the study conducted by Coughlin et al., taxes have 
negative effects on the location of foreign investment.26 However, 
according to Konig (1975) and Sharpston (1975), certain tax incentives may 
turn a country into a "tax haven" and attract non-manufacturing 
investment.27 Furthermore, another finding from Coughlin et al.'s study is 
that "states providing tax incentives, financial assistance, and employment 
assistance did not receive larger amounts of foreign direct investment."28 
Moreover, Luger and Shetty (1985) found econometric evidence that there is 
"a positive, but not always statistically significant, relationship between 
incentives and foreign investment."29 As a result, fiscal incentives and 
other incentives are not per se very effective in drawing foreign 
investment, unless they are the only difference between alternative choices 
of locations.30 Moreover, it is not productive for developing countries to 
compete with each other in offering greater fiscal incentives. Even though 
there may be an agreement regarding fiscal policy, there is always a 
possibility that a country will cheat on the agreement. 
c. A clear, efficient, and stable set of policies can attract foreign 
investment, especially if supplemented by internationally or bilaterally 
agreed codes of conduct, with regard to auditing, taxation, employment 
requirements, arbitration, exchange controls, and others.31 
d. Pursuing protectionist policy by implementing a tariff-quota strategy 
can affect foreign investment indirectly. This policy, which refers to an 
import-substitution strategy, might induce foreign firms which used to 
export their products to a country, to invest and set up plants there.32 
However, the general implementation of this protection policy will result 
in inefficiency in production by domestic industry, because the domestic 
industry will always depend on protection rather then improving 
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efficiency,33 and discourages export of goods produced by the domestic 
industry.34 Therefore, the host government should be careful in using this 
policy. 
e. Several other policies which can help host governments to attract 
foreign capital are ease of entry, flexible conditions as regards local 
equity participation, the provision of skilled labour, and infrastructural 
facilities.35 
However, some conditions cannot be controlled by government policy. 
Examples of such conditions are the growth of oligopoly, technological 
change, and competition and marketing strategy. 
Probably, the ideal foreign investment-host government relationship is 
described by the framework of analysis developed by Reuber (1973). Reuber 
holds that "government policies should aim at removing tariff, tax, and 
direct control 'distortions' at encouraging the inflow of foreign capital, 
and at minimizing specific controls on foreign investment." In the long 
run, Reuber's opinion is that the ideal situation would "presumably be a 
fully integrated international production structure dominated by 
multinational economics, with few or no government controls or national 
restrictions. m36 
However, this statement cannot be applied to all host countries 
without considering the condition of the country. Huang presented general 
hypotheses as follows: (1) the more the country, in this case the 
developing country, needs foreign investment economically or politically, 
the stronger will be the incentives offered, and the less restrictive will 
be the regulations imposed on foreign investors; (2) however, the less 
restrictive are the regulations imposed, the more likely it is that the 
foreign capital endangers the sectors in which local entrepreneurs are 
weak.37 
However, there is also a view that the most important factor in 
attracting foreign capital is the "environment" of a particular country. 
The meaning of "environment" here is the political and economic conditions 
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that indirectly support the business activity of foreign investors. This 
might be in the form of political and economic stability, such as constant 
government regulation, good infrastructure, low crime rates, and low 
inflation. Specific incentives such as a tax exemption are useful in 
inducing foreign investment, if this is taken to be a signal that 
government favors foreign investment. The host government cannot expect 
too much from using special incentives to attract foreign investment. 
Neglecting the "environment” may reduce tax revenue and add only a little 
of foreign investment.38 Yet, sometimes, even though the government has 
already tried to create a good "environment" or investment climate, the 
result of attracting investment is not as expected, because that 
"environment" is not what the investor most needs. 
Government policy also can discourage foreign investment. Programs 
used by the host government to require a "buy-national product" strategy 
will discourage foreign investment.39 The use of a priority list which 
contains sectoral programs opened or closed for foreign investment might 
also affect foreign investors who are interested in investing in a 
particu1ar indu stry. 
As noted before, the government policy is not the only thing that 
influences foreign investment decisions. The relationship of foreign 
investment decisions with other factors is so complicated that one scholar 
pointed out that "the entire foreign investment decision is highly 
arbitrary."40 Another scholar, Raymond Vernon (1972), states that "the 
foreign investment decision is achieved by a process that appears to have 
little structure and little relationships to rationality."41 This implies 
that the decision to invest in a host country might be based on some 
irrational factors. 
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CHAPTER III 
GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN 1965-1990 
After taking effective power in March 1969, the Soeharto Government 
put forth efforts to restore the economic and social condition of the 
country, which was left in miserable shape by the Soekarno government. 
Shortages of food and clothing, lack of jobs, and high inflation were some 
of the problems that were faced by the "New Order" government of Soeharto 
at that time. In the effort for recovery, the new government launched a 
series of Five-Year Development Plans, each of which is called REPELITA, an 
acronym of Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun. These Five-Year Development 
Plans are considered to be the national development objectives. The plans 
basically consist of general goals for economic progress. 
REPELITA I, which covered the period of 1969/1970 - 1974/1975, was 
mostly a stabilization plan, in which the goals were to decrease inflation, 
to raise the production of food and consumer goods, to increase primary 
exports, and to rehabilitate the infrastructure. The emphasis of this plan 
was on the development of agriculture and its linkage industry. 
REPELITA II (1974/1975 - 1978/1979) had its target to improve the 
general standard of living by providing sufficient food, clothing, and 
housing materials, improving infrastructure, and providing a more equitable 
distribution of public assistance. 
The Third Five-Year Development Plan and The Fourth Five-Year 
Development Plan extended the goals of industrial diversification and 
backward integration. In REPELITA III, the goal was to encourage 
industries that create employment opportunities and provide import- 
substitution goods. In REPELITA IV, forward and backward linkages between 
industry and agriculture are expected to be strengthened by the development 
of basic industries which produce raw material for industries and capital 
goods. 
What is the relationship between REPELITA and foreign investment in 
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Indonesia, especially in the context of the manufacturing sector? 
Actually, foreign investment is not mentioned explicitly in any of the 
REPELITAs. Yet, to be able to implement the plans in REPELITA, foreign 
investment is needed due to the lack of domestic investment, shortage of 
capital, and lack of knowledge in technology and expertise. Foreign 
investment is also important for encouraging some particular industries. 
For example, during REPELITA I, foreign investors were directed to invest 
in primary sectors which produce raw materials, such as oil and mining 
industries, with the expectation that the availability of such raw 
materials will encourage domestic investment in the downstream industries, 
such as textiles and consumer goods. The other example is that in the 
second REPELITA, foreign investment was allowed to participate in the 
industry that processes raw materials into finished products, in order for 
the domestic investors to have broader views about industrial commodities 
and the technology of producing those products. In the fourth REPELITA, 
foreign investment also was encouraged to take part in the export-oriented 
operations. 
In addition, in the Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (Guide-Lines of 
State Policy), it is stated that basically the economic development 
activities, particularly investments, are left to private-sector 
initiatives, while government is involved in directing the economy towards 
National Development Objectives as expressed in REPELITA. Foreign 
investment, which mostly is private investment, is expected to carry a part 
of those economic activities. In order for foreign investment to be able 
to take part in the way that is expected by the host country, the policy 
environment is one of the important things that should be designed 
properly. 
Government Policies of Foreign Investment in Indonesia 
The policy of foreign investment is only one subset of 
macroeconomic policies, such as fiscal policies and exchange rate policies. 
However, the policies that have direct links among key macro-economic 
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policy considerations to the development of foreign investment have to be 
counted. Consequently, such policies should be examined in order to 
analyze their influences in attracting foreign investment. 
The new era of foreign investment in Indonesia began in January 1967, 
after the enactment of Foreign Investment Law No. 1. This law is one of 
the signals of the New Order government to restore the economic condition 
of the country. 
The environment policy that accompanied the investment law of 1967 
really reflected an open-door policy, as noted in the statement of 
Professor Sadli, who was Minister of Mining: 
When we started out attracting foreign investment in 1967, everything 
and everyone was welcome. We did not dare to refuse, we did not even 
dare to ask for bonafidity or credentials.1 
The investment law offered a wide range of financial incentives to 
foreign investors. Most incentives were in the form of a reduction, such 
as: 
- a tax holiday of two years for all investment in "priority" areas, and a 
longer period for paying taxes for certain circumstances, or 
- an exemption from payment of import duties and sales taxes on initial 
purchases of machinery and equipment. 
Beside the incentives, there was a guarantee that profit and capital 
could be repatriated. Also, there was no restriction on foreign equity, 
and there were very few restrictions on the employment of foreign 
personnel. 
Another important feature after the enactment of the investment law of 
1967 was the bureaucratic system surrounding the implementation of that 
law. The power of implementing the new foreign investment law after its 
enactment was held by the ministry. 
In managing the investment activity, the government implemented a 
licensing system. Before establishing a plant, a foreign investor 
applicant had to obtain the approval of the relevant department, which 
evaluated the proposal together with the technical team. The technical 
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team was a team whose members were appointed by the president, and could 
have other members from some departments. The application was then 
forwarded to the president, who was empowered to give approval. The final 
license was then provided by the relevant Minister. 
The "liberal open-door policy"2 did not last long. About 2 years 
after its enactment, the policy was changed. Numerous requirements were 
imposed for getting the license. In addition, the commercial regulation 
environment, including taxation, labour laws, and land titles, was 
extremely uncertain. 
Another problem was that, although the technical team could offer 
financial incentives, this team could not make the policy. The policy was 
made by the ministry, which determined the priority sectors and controlled 
trade policy, by using quotas and licenses. 
In 1973, through Presidential Decrees (Keputusan Presiden) 20 and 21, 
BKPM was established. BKPM is an acronym for Badan Koordinasi Penanaman 
Modal, or the Investment Coordinating Board. BKPM performed the same 
function as the technical team, but its authority was extended to include 
all foreign investment except that in oil and gas, banking, and insurance. 
BKPM performed as the 'one-stop' service for foreign and domestic firms 
which plan to invest in Indonesia. As the administration changed, the 
policy was becoming more restrictive. Certain fields were closed off to 
new foreign investment. 
In January 1974, the government announced the principles regulating 
all new foreign investors as a result of the protests against Japanese 
investment which exploded during the visit of Prime Minister Tanaka. These 
principles included:3 
- that all new investment was to be in the form of joint ventures, 
- Indonesian equity should be increased within a "certain period" (up to 15 
years), 
- the list of industries closed to foreign investment was to be extended, 
some incentives were to be reduced 
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- the number of foreign personnel was to be restricted, 
- fines for expatriates holding positions which could be held by 
Indonesians, and 
- foreign investors have to provide training for Indonesian employees to 
fill positions that used to be held by foreign employees. 
Even though these new policies were never fully implemented,4 the 
interest in foreign investment decreased considerably in the period of 
1975/1976, probably because at the same time PERTAMINA, an acronym for 
Perusahaan Tambang Minyak Negara, which is a national oil company, was in 
crisis. On the other hand, the government also introduced a new 
regulation. In February 1977, BKPM issued the Investment Priority List 
(Daftar Skala Prioritas, DSP) for the first time. Daftar Skala Prioritas 
is a list which consists of sectors of industry that are opened, closed, or 
open on a restricted basis, open with some incentives, open with full 
incentives, or open without incentive. Daftar Skala Prioritas is prepared 
by the relevant departments, based on their estimates of domestic market 
growth. BKPM, then, meets and negotiates with the relevant ministry about 
the proposal of DSP, before publishing the list. DSP acts as a tool in the 
licensing system. In order for the investor to get an approval of the 
license to build his or her plan, the particular sector has to be in the 
opened list of DSP. 
In October 1977, administrative procedures were simplified and 
centralized, with one-stop service in BKPM to process foreign investment 
approval. Foreign investors basically were able to deal exclusively with 
BKPM, without any need to deal with the ministry which exercised control 
over the particular factor. At the same time, the approval period was to 
be reduced to fourteen weeks. 
In 1984, the government implemented a policy that includes abolition 
of many of the incentives that used to be given to foreign investors. 
Despite all the incentives to help foreign investment, 
some sectors gradually had been closed to foreign investors, or were 
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reserved exclusively for co-operatives. This increasingly restrictive 
foreign investment policy, the abolition of tax holidays, and the economic 
recession led to a decrease in the application of foreign investment. 
The foreign investment policy changed to a more liberal approach again 
in 1985. Administrative requirements were simplified, and some complex 
requirements were waived, such as a feasibility study, initial approval of 
plant layout, a statement from the Indonesian Embassy of the foreign 
investor's country of origin, and evidence of the investor's land 
application permit.5 The maximum period for BKPM approval was also reduced 
to six weeks. 
An important step was taken in 1986. In order to promote the growth 
of non-oil exports and to make Indonesia more attractive to investors, the 
government announced a regulation package of May 6, 1986. This was a 
modification of the former regulation of foreign investment, and was 
designed to ease the entry of foreign capital and to improve the 
environment for foreign investment. This package included the following 
provisions: 
1. Foreign firms which previously could not engage in retail trade, would 
have the same rights as domestic firms in distributing their products in 
the local market. Foreign firms also have the right to get credits from 
state banks. This means that a foreign firm can be treated as a 
domestic firm. In order to be eligible for these rights, foreign firms 
have to fulfill the requirement of 75% Indonesian Equity (or 50%, if a 
public company). Those things were not available earlier. 
2. All sectors, even the sectors that were originally closed to foreign 
investors, would be opened to foreign firms which exported at least 85% 
of their production. Previously the requirement was 100%. 
3. The requirement that the minimum foreign investment in a project should 
be at least $1 million was relaxed. 
4. A foreign investment company may reinvest its profits in its own 
business for expansion purposes, or in other enterprises, either new or 
26 
existing, in a similar or different economic sector, where foreign 
investment is permitted. And this investment will be treated as new 
investment for purposes of regulation. 
5. Projects involving high-risk sophisticated technology, or large capital, 
located in remote areas, or planning to export at least 85% of their 
production, could now start with the local partner's share being as low 
as 5%, which should be gradually increased to 20%. 
With all these efforts and incentives provided by the new order, it 
seems that foreign investment policy during the New Order government is 
really liberal, or reflects an "open-door policy." However, this is not 
really correct.6 The reason is that the government has pressures either 
from its own ideological view or from nationalist sentiment and political 
lobbying to tighten controls on the inflow of capital further.7 This 
condition will not attract foreign investment as expected. 
27 
Endnotes 
ll. Palmer, The Indonesian Economy Since 1965 (London: Frank Cass and 
Co., 1978), 100. 
2Hall Hill, Foreign Investment and Industrialization in Indonesia 
(New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1988), 134. 
President Soeharto, "Policy Directives for Private Investment," a 
policy statement of 24 January 1974, p. 1. 
Sill, op. cit., p. 31. 
Simplification of Procedures and Investment Approvals (Jakarta: BKPM, 
1985). 
Srll, op. cit., p* 71. 
7Dorojatun Kuntjoro Yakti, "Indonesia," in Pattern and Impact of 
Foreign Investment in the ESCAP Region (Bangkok: United Nations and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 1985), 71. 
28 
CHAPTER IV 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data 
The purpose of this study is to analyze whether there is a 
relationship between government regulation and foreign investment. 
The data that are used for this analysis are the level of approved 
foreign direct investment in Indonesia. The approved data are based on the 
amount of money that the investor intended to invest. "Approved data" 
refers to gross investment. The term includes the equity contribution of 
both the foreign and domestic partner, and foreign loans. Therefore, the 
data do not reflect purely the equity share of foreign investment. 
However, the percentage of Indonesian equity in the foreign investment 
capital was small compared to foreign equity and loan capital. For 
example, the percentage of Indonesian equity in 1985 was 12%, while the 
percentage of foreign equity and foreign loans were 23% and 66%, 
respectively.1 Because this study considers foreign investment mainly as 
the inflow of capital, both foreign equity and foreign loans are not of 
concern. What matters is the amount of capital and not the form of 
capital. Due to the higher percentage of both equity and foreign loans, 
compared to Indonesian equity, the data can be considered to be the level 
of foreign direct investment. Even though after January 1974, the policy 
required that Indonesian equity has to be 51% of the total investment, 
foreign capital is still more than what is written. The reason is that a 
foreign partner often lends money to his or her Indonesian partner, in 
order to fulfill the equity sharing requirement.2 Another reason 
is that most of the Indonesian partners borrowed money from financial 
institutions abroad. Therefore, even the Indonesian equity often can be 
considered as foreign capital. 
The source of the data is Financial Report of Bank Indonesia, which 
recorded the data from BKPM (Investment Coordinating Board). The exception 
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is for the data on manufacturing and total investment, which are quoted 
from Table 3.2. in Foreign Investment and Industrialization Indonesia3 
which also are based on BKPM data. 
In recording the data, if the data appear in more than one issue of 
Financial Report of Bank Indonesia, the latest data were used. For 
example, 1970 investment data appear three times: in the 1970/1971 report, 
the 1971/1972 report, and the 1972/1973 report. In this case, the 1970 
data in the 1973/1974 report were used. 
The data cover eight sectors, as follows: 
1. Agriculture, forestry, and fishery, 
2. Mining, 
3. Manufacturing, which consists of: 
- Food 
- Textiles and leather 
- Wood and wood products 
- Paper and paper products 
- Chemicals and rubber 
- Non-metallic minerals 
- Basic metal 
- Metal products 
- Other manufacturing products that are not covered under the above 
categories. 
4. Construction, 
5. Trade and hotels, 
6. Transportation and communications, 
7. Residential and office, and 
8. Services. 
Actually, there is a ninth category, named "others," which covers the 
products that are not covered by the other eight categories. Due to the 
presence of zero values for all of the data for this category, it was not 
included in the present analysis. Also, most of the data values for the 
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residential and office category are zero* Therefore, these data too were 
not analyzed* An important note is that these data exclude the petroleum 
sector, banking, and insurance. The reason is that those sectors are under 
the supervision of other departments which are outside BKPM (Investment 
Coordinating Board) authority. 
Some of the approved data values for the useable series are zero. 
This can be interpreted in two ways: either there was no investment 
approval issued for that particular subsector in that year, or that for 
accounting purposes, approved investment was counted as part of the 
following year for that subsector. 
The data represent the annual approved direct foreign investment for 
the years 1970 to 1990. The length of the series is 21 years, with an 
exception for the data on the total investment and manufacturing sector, 
which start from 1967, which provides a 24 years' length for that series. 
Actually, it would be better to analyze the implementation data, rather 
than the approved data. The implementation data are based on the 
realization of the plans that are put in the investment. However, due to 
limitations of the implementation data, the approved data were used instead 
of the implementation data. This is appropriate because the approved data 
are related to the amount of capital the investor intended to invest. 
Methodology 
The method used for analyzing the data is time series analysis, 
following the Box-Jenkins strategy, by conducting univariate and 
intervention modeling of the approved foreign investment data through the 
ARIMA procedure of the Statistical Analysis System (SAS) computer package. 
Even though the Box-Jenkins strategy usually refers to forecasting, this 
study does not deal with forecasting investment data, but deals only with 
modeling the data and looking to see whether there are any significant 
changes after the government implemented a policy or a regulation. What is 
meant by modeling is to find a good way of stating the statistical 
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relationships existing within the data in the series, "Time-series data” 
refers to observations on a variable that occur in a time sequence. Two 
forms of modeling are used in this analysis: univariate time-series 
analysis and intervention modeling. 
Univariate Time-Series Analysis 
Using time-series methods with a single or univariate model means that 
the analysis is based on the single series, or one variable. In this 
study, the analysis is limited initially to the investment data, and no 
other data series are involved at this stage. 
Box and Jenkins propose ARIMA modeling to analyze and forecast 
univariate time series data. ARIMA is an acronym for Autoregressive 
Integrated Moving Average. 
Pankratz (1983) raised the question: "When may Univariate Box-Jenkins 
models (UBJ) be used?"4 According to Pankratz, some requirements should be 
followed: 
(1) Data Types. 
UBJ models may be applied to either discrete data or continuous data. 
For either type of data, equally spaced, discrete time intervals are 
required. This means that if the data are recorded annually, the other 
data also have to be based on annual observations. Data that are measured 
continuously without having any discrete time intervals cannot be used. 
The investment data that are used in this analysis are continuous data with 
discrete time intervals of one year. 
The method applies to either seasonal or non-seasonal data. Seasonal 
data means that the series follows a seasonal pattern, such as temperature 
recordings, which follow weather patterns. These investment data are non- 
seasonal data. 
(2) Sample size. 
Box and Jenkins suggest that about 50 observations are required to get 
a good model and an accurate forecast. However, with a smaller sample 
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size, this method still can be used, but it has to be done with caution, 
due to the poor estimates of the parameters that are caused by the smaller 
sample size. 
(3) Stationary Series. 
According to Pankratz (1983), the UBJ-ARIMA method may be applied only 
to a stationary data series, which is a series that has a mean, variance, 
and autocorrelation function that are essentially constant through time. 
However, according to Meeker,2 * * 5 this method "can fix things up even if a 
series is not stationary." 
The Box-Jenkins Modeling Procedure 
An ARIMA model is an algebraic statement showing how a time 
series variable (Zt) is related to its own past values (ZM, Zt_2, Zt_3 ...). 
The Box-Jenkins Modeling procedure consists of three stages:6 
1. Tentative Identification of Model. 
In this stage, we look at various statistics, graphs, the 
autocorrelation function (ACF), and the partial autocorrelation function 
(PACF), and choose one or more ARIMA models as candidates. 
2. Estimation of Model Parameters. 
By using some kind of estimation method, such as non-linear least 
squares or maximum likelihood, we get estimates of the parameters of the 
model(s) chosen at stage 1. 
In order to know whether the model is appropriate, we evaluate the 
parameter estimate, by checking the t-ratio of the parameter estimate, 
particularly as to whether it is significant or not (greater than or equal 
to 2), and by checking the p-value, which is supposed to be less than 0.05 
for considering a parameter estimate to be significant. 
Another indicator for an appropriate model is the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC). According to the Encyclopedia of Statistical Sciences 
(1982), the Akaike Information Criterion is "a criterion used to decide on 
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the order of a regression, where there is a natural sequence for 
introduction of successive predictor values (e.g. ARIMA, polynomial 
regression)."7 The value of AIC of the better model is smaller than AIC 
other models. 
3. Diagnostic Checking. 
Residual analysis is used in this stage primarily for the purpose of 
checking the candidate model(s) for adequacy. At this stage we use the 
residuals to test hypotheses about the independence of random shocks. The 
random shocks are assumed to be independent (white noise) in UBJ - ARIMA 
modeling. If the residuals are autocorrelated, they are not white noise 
and another model should be found to get residuals that are consistent with 
the independence assumption.8 Put in another way, if the estimated model 
is properly chosen, then the random shocks should be uncorrelated. 
Many ways are used to check the independence of residuals. Two of 
them are as follows: 
- The residual autocorrelation function. 
The residual ACF for a properly built ARIMA model ideally will have 
autocorrelation coefficients that are all statistically zero. However, 
because we use estimates of ARIMA coefficients, it is possible to have 
residual autocorrelation values that are nonzero, due to sampling error, 
even when the suggested model is a good model. 
- Chi-square test. 
If the chi-square values of the residuals for a certain number of 
degrees of freedom are less than their critical values, the residual 
autocorrelations are concluded not to be significantly different from zero, 
which means that the random shocks are independent, or uncorrelated. The 
probability of getting this particular chi-square value is also observed. 
A larger probability of having that Chi-square value means a larger 
probability that the residuals are zero or uncorrelated. 
All of these procedures are conducted by computer, using the PROC 
ARIMA component of the Statistical Analysis System. 
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Intervention Modeling 
This approach is used for modeling time-series data in which there are 
certain exceptional events have which affected the variable measured by the 
time series.9 Some examples are as follows: 
- the effect of promotional events on sales. 
- strikes by a labor union. 
- changes in policy, regulation, or legislation. 
For the purpose of intervention modeling, the time sequence in which 
the exceptional event took place is characterized by a dummy variable in 
the form of an "impulse” with values of zero before the event happened and 
one following the event. 
The identification of intervention models consists of several stages: 
1. Look at a plot of the time series realization after identifying the time 
of the external event. 
2. Examine the residuals of a preliminary noise model, which is a 
univariate model. 
3. Consider the underlying mechanisms related to the event. 
4. Re-estimate the model, with appropriate intervention parameters 
included. 
The Approved Foreign Investment Data Analysis 
The analysis of the approved foreign investment data is conducted 
through three steps: 
1. Plotting the data. 
The data from each sector is plotted with the abscissa referring to 
the natural logarithm of the investment and the ordinate referring to the 
sequence of years from 1967 to 1990. The reason for taking the natural 
logarithm of the investment data is to stabilize the variances of the 
data, which have a high level of fluctuation throughout the time series. 
Throught this analysis, "approved investment" refers to the level of 
approved foreign investment. 
2. Modeling the data with Univariate Time Series. 
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This analysis is conducted for each series of the data. In finding 
the optimal model, both non-differencing and differencing of the series 
were applied. Three stages of modeling are involved: identification, 
estimation, and diagnostic checking. 
3. Analyzing the data with intervention modeling. 
After finding an appropriate model, the model is fitted to the data, 
and at the same time intervention modeling is applied. There are four 
policies that are analyzed by employing dummy variables equal to zero until 
the year the policy change occurred and one thereafter. The series that 
are used as dummy variables are as follows: 
a. The series of 1978, which values are used to analyze the effect of the 
policy of 1977, which is related to the requirement to use the 
Investment Priority List as a reference in issuing the investment 
approval. In this analysis, this refers to the effect of Policy I. 
b. The series of 1975, which values are used to analyze the effect of the 
change in investment policy in 1974, that is President Soeharto's 
speech after the incident of "MALARI" on January 5, 1974. In this 
analysis this is called the effect of Policy II. 
c. The series of 1985, which values are used to analyze the effect of the 
regulation to abolish incentives for foreign investors in 1984. This is 
called the effect of Policy III. 
d. The series of 1987, which values are used to analyze the effect of the 
May 6, 1986 deregulation package. This is called the effect of 
Policy IV. 
The intervention modeling in this analysis is conducted in two ways: 
a. By conducting the intervention modeling using each series after each 
policy is implemented as a dummy variable. 
b. By conducting the intervention modeling using all four of the series 
after the policies are implemented as dummy variables. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Analysis of Approved Foreign Investment in Agriculture, 
Forestry, and Fishery 
Plotting the data 
Figure 1 shows the plot over time of approved foreign investment in 
the agriculture, forestry, and fishery sector. The plot shows fluctuation 
throughout the time period. The level of approved investment was very high 
in the first year of 1970, at $101.2 million, and then dropped to $25.1 
million in 1971. 
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Figure 1. Approved foreign investment in agriculture, forestry, and 
fishery, 1970-1990 
In the years following 1971, the investment approvals were up and 
down, with no clear trend. The 1984 value, of $0.2 million approved 
investment, could be considered as an outlier, because it is very different 
from the rest of the data. 
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The level of approved investment dropped fifty percent from 1974 to 
1975. One possible reason for this drop is that the investment policy 
announced by President Soeharto after the incident of January 1974, which 
put some constraints on foreign investment, may have affected the intention 
of foreign investor to apply for investment in this sector. 
The investment decreased considerably in 1985, probably because of the 
abolition of many incentives in January 1984 and the prohibition on the 
export of timber logs which was regulated by the Three Minister Letter 
regulation in 1983. 
The level of approved investment for the agriculture, forestry, and 
fishery sector rose again after 1985. That increase may have been caused 
by the implementation of the May 6, 1986 deregulation package, which 
changed some restrictions on foreign investment. 
Modeling the Data with Univariate Time Series 
From the identification analysis, the ACF plots and the PACF plots are 
shown in Figure 2. Please note that the number of degrees of freedom that 
is used in this statistical analysis is 17, unless it is indicated 
differently. 
Without differencing, the ACF plot and PACF plot suggest an AR(1) 
model. With one period of differencing, the ACF plot suggests an AR(1,1) 
model, but the PACF is ambiguous. The ACF and PACF plot of the AR(1,1) 
model is not shown here, because that is not the optimal model. 
Estimation and diagnostic checking give the results as shown in Table 
1. The t-ratio for the AR(1) parameter estimate without differencing is 
< 2, but still quite substantial compared with the t-ratio for the 
parameter estimate when differencing is used, which is not nearly 
significant at all. The chi-square of residuals with d = 0 is less than 
the chi-square of residuals when first-differencing is applied to the 
series. 
(a) Autocorrelation Function (ACF) 
Lag Covariance Correlation -198765432101234567891 
0 1.104512 1.00000 ******************** 
1 0.345937 0.31320 # ****** 
2 -0.074836 -0.06775 * . 
3 -0.233723 -0.21161 **** . 
4 -0.170787 -0.15463 it it* • 
5 -0.408056 -0.36944 it it it it it it it . 
6 -0.290939 -0.26341 m ititititit . 
7 0.029392 0.02661 * 
8 0.144099 0.13046 *** 
9 0.268764 0.24333 ***** 
10 0.048089 0.04354 * 
11 -0.037454 -0.03391 # * 
12 -0.062900 -0.05695 • * 
13 0.086795 0.07858 ** 
14 -0.146909 -0.13301 *** 
15 -0.106373 -0.09631 ** 
16 0.012643 0.01145 
17 0.035137 0.03181 * 
18 -0.022670 -0.02052 
19 -0.0077073 -0.00698 
20 0.039242 0.03553 * 
(b) Partial Autocorrelation Function (PACF) 
Lag Correlation -198765432101234567891 
1 0.31320 ***** # 
2 -0.18389 **** 
3 -0.14791 # *** 
4 -0.05202 * 
5 -0.39851 #******** 
6 -0.11828 • ** 
7 0.03524 * 
8 -0.11588 ** 
9 0.18016 **** 
10 -0.24932 ***** 
11 -0.10491 * * * 
12 0.05477 * 
13 0.06103 * 
14 -0.14323 # *** 
15 0.01854 
16 -0.08762 • * * 
17 -0.09079 • ** 
18 0.03985 * 
19 -0.05860 # * 
20 -0.06996 • * 
Figure 2. ACF and PACF of the agriculture, forestry, and fishery data 
series without differencing 
40 
Table 1. The results of parameter estimation and residual analysis 
of the agriculture, forestry, and fishery data series 
No Differencing 
d = 0 
With Differencing 
d = 1 
t-ratioa 1.47 - 0.92 
AIC 63.3927 67.8387 
Residual 
chi-square 11.35 12.89 
Prob. of 
chi-square 0.838 0.743 
aFor the AR(1) parameter. 
The probability that the autocorrelation of residuals equals zero is 
greater when there is no differencing used in the series than when first 
differencing is applied. The AIC is smaller when d = 0 than when d = 1. 
Therefore, AR(1) is chosen as an optimal initial model. 
Analyzing the data with intervention modeling 
The first way that intervention analysis of the data is employed in 
this study is by conducting intervention modeling using four separate dummy 
variables, one for each model, to represent the intervals before (coded 
"0") and after (coded ”1”) each policy is implemented. The results are 
presented in Table 2. The results show that the t-ratio of the parameter 
estimate is only significant for the effect of Policy III. The AIC of the 
estimation for the intervention modeling of Policy III is smaller, compared 
to the AICs of the other series. 
The chi-square value for the residuals of the Policy III is less than 
the chi-square value of Policy I, and also less than the chi-square value 
of Policy II and Policy IV. The probability of chi-square for Policy III 
is greater than the probability of chi-square for the other policies. The 
conclusion is that Policy III, which refers to the 1984 regulation which 
eliminated many incentives on foreign investment, had an impact on the 
level of foreign investment in agriculture, fishery, and forestry. 
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Table 2. The results of analyzing the effect of each of four policy changes 
on the agriculture, forestry, and fishery data series 
Policy I Policy II Policy III Policy IV 
t-ratioa 0.27 0.36 2.15 1.31 
AIC 65.3058 65.2424 60.8283 63.8734 
Residual 
Chi-square 10.92 11.00 10.83 11.91 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.861 0.857 0.865 0.806 
aFor the intervention parameter. 
The second way in which the intervention modeling analysis was 
conducted was by using simultaneously four dummy variables representing the 
four policies implemented. The results are presented in Table 3. 
The t-ratios show that there is no significant partial effect of any 
policy. There is only one value for AIC , which cannot be compared directly 
with results from the previous analysis. The diagnostic checking gave a 
value of chi- square that is less than the single-intervention model number 
of degrees of freedom, and the high probability of chi -square supports the 
Table 3. The results of analyzing the simultaneous effect of all policies 
on the agriculture. , fishery, and forestry data series 
Policy I Policy II Policy III Policy IV 
t-ratioa - 0.03 - 0.47 1.67 - 0.06 
AICb 66.2580 
Residual . 
Chi-squareD 12.06 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.797 
For the intervention parameter. 
DThere is only one value for the simultaneous model, 
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evidence that there is no autocorrelation remaining among the residuals, 
which means that the modeling was conducted properly. 
The conclusion is that, from this kind of intervention modeling, no 
policy among the four policies considered is detected to have a significant 
partial effect on the level of foreign investment in the agriculture, 
fishery, and forestry sector. 
Analysis of approved foreign investment in the mining sector 
Plotting the data 
Figure 3 shows the plot of foreign investment data in the mining 
sector. This plot shows that the trend of approved foreign investment data 
in mining is irregular. There is no pattern that can be traced from this 
plot. Most of the data values are zero, which could be caused by the 
absence of investment, or possibly by the unavailability of a record of 
such investment during that year. 
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Figure 3. Approved foreign investment in mining, 1970-1990 
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The highest value of the approved foreign investment occurred in 1975, 
at a level of $507.2 million, but then decreased drastically to only $10.9 
million. This was probably due to the policy of the government regarding 
production sharing following the PERTAMINA crisis. The policy of January 
1974 might also have affected this decrease. 
Modeling the Data with Univariate Time Series 
From the identification analysis, the ACF and PACF plots are as shown 
in Figure 4. Without differencing, the ACF suggests an AR(1) model, but 
the PACF plot is ambiguous. These two plots are not shown here. With one 
period of differencing, the ACF and PACF plots suggest an AR(1,1) 
model. 
Estimation and diagnostic checking give the results shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. The results of parameter estimation and residual analysis 
of the mining data series 
No Differencing 
d = 0 
With Differencing 
d = 1 
t-ratioa 1.99 - 3.00 
AIC 107.0067 102.8850 
Residual 
Chi-square 17.13 16.12 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.446 0.515 
aFor the AR(1) parameter. 
The t-ratio for the AR(1) parameter estimate without differencing is 
on the border line of 2, but smaller compared to the t-ratio for the 
parameter estimate when differencing is used, which is highly significant. 
The AIC is smaller when d = 1 than when d = 0. The chi-square value for 
the residuals with d = 0 is larger than its degrees of freedom (df = 17). 
The chi-square for the residuals with d = 1 is less than its degrees of 
freedom. 
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(a) Autocorrelation Function (ACF) 
Lag Covariance Correlation -198765432101234567891 
0 6.197643 1.00000 ******************** 
1 -3.191425 -0.51494 ********** # 
2 1.079134 0.17412 * * ★ 
3 -0.117505 -0.01896 
4 0.372277 0.06007 * 
5 -0.435416 -0.07026 ★ 
6 -0.395286 -0.06378 # * 
7 1.189709 0.19196 **** 
8 -2.218454 -0.35795 ******* 
9 1.469943 0.23718 ★ * * * * 
10 -1.041362 -0.16803 * ★ ★ 
11 0.412150 0.06650 * 
12 -0.402869 -0.06500 ★ 
13 0.566415 0.09139 ** 
14 -0.869189 -0.14025 * * ★ 
15 0.391321 0.06314 ★ 
16 0.865153 0.13959 *** 
17 -1.072293 -0.17302 *** 
18 0.144082 0.02325 . 
19 -0.0013910 -0.00022 # 
20 -0.014563 -0.00235 • • 1 
(b) Partial Autocorrelation Function (PACF) 
Lag Correlation -198765432101234567891 
1 -0.51494 ********** i • i 
2 -0.12390 * * 
3 0.02489 
4 0.11207 ★ * 
5 0.00671 
6 -0.15914 *** 
7 0.11220 ** 
8 -0.26325 ***** 
9 -0.07903 # ** 
10 -0.09829 • * * 
11 -0.05642 # * 
12 -0.02345 
13 0.05070 * 
14 -0.16534 # * * * 
15 -0.03612 # * 
16 0.10247 * * m 
17 -0.01384 
18 -0.18362 # **** 
19 -0.14165 # *★* 
20 -0.12530 # **★ 
Figure 4. ACF and PACF of the mining data series with differencing 
The probability that the auto-correlation of residuals equals zero i 
greater when there is one period of differencing used in the series than 
when there is no differencing applied. Therefore we conclude that the 
assumption of white noise residuals for the AR(1,1) model is more 
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appropriate than for the AR(1) model. As a result, AR(1,1) is chosen as an 
optimal initial model. 
Analyzing the data with intervention modeling 
The first way that the data are employed in intervention analysis of 
this study is by conducting intervention modeling using four separate dummy 
variables, one for each model, to represent the intervals before (coded 
"0") and after (coded "1”) each policy is implemented. The results are 
presented in Table 5. 
The results show that the t-ratios of the parameter estimates are 
significant for the effects of Policy II and III. The AIC values of the 
estimation for the intervention modeling of Policy II and Policy III are 
smaller compared to the AICs of the other series. The chi-square value for 
the residuals of the Policy III model is the smallest. The chi-square 
value of the Policy II model is still less than its degrees of freedom. 
The probability levels of these two chi-Square values are the largest for 
Policy III and quite moderate for Policy II. This means that the 
probability of zero autocorrelation among the residuals for each policy 
model is substantial, which indicates that the assumption of white noise 
among residuals for the two models is appropriate. 
Table 5. The results of analyzing the effect of each of four policy changes 
on the mining data series 
Policy I Policy II Policy III Policy IV 
t-ratioa - 0.32 - 2.03 - 2.42 - 1.30 
AIC 98.2562 95.0396 94.3278 96.7784 
Residual 
Chi-square 18.65 14.98 11.86 13.52 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.349 0.646 0.809 0.701 
aFor the intervention parameter. 
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As a result of this analysis, we conclude that Policy II and III 
affect the series, with Policy III having a more notable effect than Policy 
II. This means that the 1977 regulation of Investment Priority List, and 
the 1984 regulation, have had impacts on the level of foreign investment in 
the mining sector. 
The second way in which the intervention modeling analysis was 
conducted was by using simultaneously all four dummy variables representing 
the four policies implemented. The results are presented in Table 6. 
The t-ratios show that there is no significant partial effect of any 
policy. There is only one value for AIC, which cannot be compared directly 
with results from the other analysis. The diagnostic residual checking 
gave a value of chi-square that is larger than the degrees of freedom, 
with a very small probability of chi-square. These two bits of evidence 
indicate that there might be correlations among residuals, which means that 
the assumption of random error distribution is questionable. 
The conclusion from this kind of intervention modeling is that no 
policy, among the four policies considered, is detected to have a 
significant partial effect on the level of foreign investment in the mining 
sector. 
Table 6. The results of analyzing the simultaneous effect of all policies 
on the mining data series 
Policy I Policy II Policy III Policy IV 
t-ratioa - 0.15 - 0.59 0.46 0.83 
AICb 96.5454 
Residual ^ 
Chi-squareD 22.74 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.158 
aFor the intervention parameter. 
bThere is only one value for the simultaneous model. 
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Analysis of Approved Foreign Investment: in Manufacturing 
Plotting the data 
Figure 5 shows the plot of approved foreign investment in 
manufacturing. The plot shows up-and-down movement of the level of 
approved foreign investment in the manufacturing sector, but overall the 
trend could be considered as increasing throughout the time period. 
From 1974 to 1975, the amount of approved investment increased from 
$1,125 million to $1,159 million. This is a surprise, because the policy 
of 1974 seemed to discourage foreign investment. However, this might have 
happened because the investors had already submitted the application in 
1973, and it was then approved in 1974, with the intention by the investors 
to cancel the approvals later, or not to perform realizations of the 
approval. Therefore, the effect of the 1974 policy did not occur 
instantly, as is implied by the drop of approved investment in 1976 to the 
amount of $347 million. Another reason may be related to the confusion of 
the 1974 policy, which was not formulated in the formal regulation at 
LMANUFAC 
10 
8 = 
4 = 
2 = 
★ * * * 
★ ★ ★ ★ ★ 
★ ** 
it it it 
Hi-H-H-H-H-m-H-HU-l-H-H-H-H-H-H-l-HU-l-H 1960 1970 1980 1990 
YEAR 
Figure 5. Approved foreign investment in manufacturing, 1967-1990 
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first, so that the foreign investors in manufacturing were not influenced 
by the policy immediately. After 1986, the level of approved foreign 
investment increased. This could be related to the May 6, 1986 
deregulation package. 
Modeling the data with Univariate Time Series 
From the identification analysis, the ACF plot and the PACF plot are 
shown in Figure 6. With no differencing, the ACF and the PACF plot suggest 
an AR(1) model. With one period of differencing, the ACF plot suggests an 
AR(1) model, but the PACF is not clear. These latter plots are not shown 
here. Estimation and diagnostic checking of this model give the results 
shown in Table 7. The t-ratio for the AR(1) parameter estimate without 
differencing is very significant, and the t-ratio for the parameter 
estimate with differencing is not significant at all. The AIC for d = 0 is 
bigger than the AIC for d = 1. Usually, the AIC of the better parameter 
estimate is smaller than the other model estimate. However, an AR(1) model 
is still chosen as the tentative model, because the t-ratio for this model 
is very significant. The chi-square value for the residuals with d = 0, 
with the probability 0.395, is less than its critical value. On the other 
hand, the value of chi-square for the residuals with d = 1 is more than its 
critical value. 
Table 7. The results of parameter estimation and residual analysis 
of the manufacturing data series 
No Differencing 
d = 0 
With Differencing 
d = 1 
t-ratioa 4.52 - 0.24 
AIC 50.4209 47.4817 
Residual 
Chi-square 17.91 18.85 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.395 0.337 
aFor the AR(1) parameter. 
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(a) Autocorrelation Function (ACF) 
<ag Covariance Correlation - -19 8 7 65432101234567891 
0 0.967775 1.00000 ******************** j 
1 0.544887 0.56303 • *★****★★★** 
2 0.195954 0.20248 • **** 
3 -0.083525 -0.08631 ★ * • 
4 0.0098955 0.01023 . • 
5 0.139655 0.14430 • * * * # 
6 0.225891 0.23341 ***** 
7 0.165801 0.17132 ★ ** 
8 0.121660 0.12571 * * * 
9 0.025645 0.02650 * 
10 -0.059807 -0.06180 * 
11 -0.193277 -0.19971 * * * * 
12 -0.338603 -0.34988 *★*★*★★ • 
13 -0.210391 -0.21740 **** . 
14 -0.0095338 -0.00985 
15 0.052515 0.05426 * 
16 -0.078802 -0.08143 ★ * 
17 -0.245031 -0.25319 ***** 
18 -0.342316 -0.35371 ★★**★*★ 
19 -0.244820 -0.25297 • ***** • 
20 -0.159684 -0.16500 • * * ★ • 
(b) Partial Autocorrelation Function (PACF) 
Lag Correlation -198765432101234567891 
1 0.56303 *********** 
2 -0.16768 **★ 
3 -0.18834 ★ *** 
4 0.27983 ****** # 
5 0.08589 ** 
6 0.02495 
7 0.02475 
8 0.09457 ** 
9 -0.07738 * * 
10 -0.12523 # *** 
11 -0.17672 **** 
12 -0.29751 ****** 
13 0.16228 * * * # 
14 0.09534 * * 
15 -0.19545 9 * * * * 
16 -0.06501 ★ 
17 0.02747 * 
18 -0.14969 * * * 
19 0.00212 
20 -0.03548 * 
Figure 6. ACF and PACF of the manufacturing data series without 
differencing 
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We conclude that the assumption of white noise residuals for the AR(1) 
model is more appropriate than for the AR(1,1) model. As a result, AR(1) 
is chosen as an initial model. 
Analyzing the data with intervention modeling 
The first way that the data are employed in intervention analysis of 
this study is by conducting intervention modeling using four separate dummy 
variables, one for each model, to represent the intervals before (coded 
"0") and after (coded "1"). The results are presented in Table 8. 
Table 8. The results of analyzing the effect of each of four policy changes 
on the manufacturing sector data series 
Policy I Policy II Policy III Policy IV 
t-ratioa - 1.53 3.09 - 0.02 2.48 
AIC 57.7514 51.8226 59.8150 53.8992 
Residual 
Chi-square 16.88 18.92 23.33 19.89 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.463 0.333 0.139 0.280 
aFor the intervention parameter. 
The results in Table 8 show that two of the t-ratios of the parameter 
estimate are significant, for Policy II and Policy IV. The AIC of the 
estimation for the intervention modeling of Policy II is the smallest. The 
second smallest is the AIC for Policy IV. These are appropriate if we look 
at the t-ratios of the two models, in which the t-ratio of the parameter 
estimate of Policy II is more significant compared with the t-ratio of 
Policy IV. 
In terms of diagnostic checking, the chi-square value of the residuals 
for the Policy II model is less than the chi-square value of Policy IV. 
The probability of chi-square for Policy II is larger than the probability 
of chi-square for Policy IV. However, both of the chi-square values are 
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still less than their critical values. Therefore, the assumption of 
random residuals is fulfilled in these instances of two intervention 
modeling. As a result, we conclude that Policy II and Policy IV have 
significant effects on the series starting in the year following the 
implementation of each policy. This means that Policy II, which refers to 
the 1977 Investment Priority List regulation, and Policy IV, which refers 
to 1986 deregulation, had impacts on the level of foreign investment in the 
manufacturing sector. 
The second way in which the intervention modeling analysis was 
conducted was by using simultaneously all four dummy variables representing 
the four policies implemented. The results are presented in Table 9. 
Table 9. The results of analyzing the simultaneous effect of all policies 
on the manufacturing sector data series 
Policy I Policy II Policy III Policy IV 
t-ratioa - 1.76 3.14 - 0.29 2.92 
AICb 46.7232 
Residual ^ 
Chi-squareD 15.44 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.564 
aFor the intervention parameter. 
bThere is only one value for the simultaneous model. 
The t-ratios show that there are significant partial effects of 
Policies II and IV. There is only one value for AIC, which cannot be 
compared directly with results from the other single-intervention models. 
The diagnostic residual checking gave a value of chi-square that is smaller 
than its critical value. This indicates that there is no autocorrelation 
remaining among the residuals, which means that the assumption of a random 
distribution of errors used in this model is fulfilled and that the model 
was estimated properly. 
52 
The conclusion from this kind of intervention modeling is that Policy 
II and Policy IV, among the four policies considered, have significant 
partial effects on the level of foreign investment in the manufacturing 
sector. 
Analysis of Approved Foreign Investment in Construction 
Plotting the data 
The following graph shows the plot of the data for approved foreign 
investment in construction. The plot is very scattered. Compared with the 
other sectors, the level of approved foreign investment throughout the 
period of 1970-1990 is quite small. After 1974, investment dropped 
continually until 1980. This could be caused by the policy of 1974, which 
put many restrictions on foreign investment. 
In 1985, after the abolition of many incentives, the level of approved 
investment increased to $122.3 million, then decreased until 1989. It 
seems that the May 6, 1986 package did not have any effect on approved 
foreign investment in the construction sector. 
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Figure 7. Approved foreign investment in construction, 1970-1990 
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Modeling the data with Univariate Time Series 
From the identification analysis, the ACF plot and the PACF plot are as 
shown in Figure 8. Without differencing, the ACF plot and PACF plot suggest 
an AR(1) model. With one period of differencing, the ACF plot suggests an 
AR(1), but the PACF plot does not support any particular model. These latter 
plots are not shown here. 
Estimation and diagnostic checking give the results shown in Table 10. 
The t-ratio for the AR(1) parameter estimate without differencing is less 
than 2, but still quite substantial compared with the t-ratio for the 
parameter estimate when differencing is used. The AIC is smaller when d = 0 
than when d * 1. As a result, AR(1) is chosen as a tentative model. 
The chi-square value for the residuals with d = 0 is less than the chi- 
square value for the residuals when first differencing is applied to the 
series. The probability that the autocorrelation of residuals equals zero is 
very substantial when there is no differencing used. This leads to the 
finding that the assumption of white noise residuals is fulfilled. Based on 
the results of estimation and diagnostic checking, AR(1) is chosen as an 
optimal model. 
Table 10. The results of parameter estimation and residual analysis 
of the construction data series 
No Differencing 
d = 0 
With Differencing 
d = 1 
t-ratioa 1.87 00
 
CM
 
rH
 
1
 
AIC 67.5932 69.4527 
Residual 
Chi-square 8.53 12.37 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.954 0.778 
aFor the AR(1) parameter. 
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(a) Autocorrelation Function (ACF) 
Lag Covariance Correlation -198765432101234567891 
0 1.439743 1.00000 ******************** 
1 0.558445 0.38788 # ********# 
2 0.258814 0.17976 • ★ *** 
3 0.130059 0.09033 • ** 
4 0.099785 0.06931 • * 
5 -0.032620 -0.02266 • 
6 -0.228293 -0.15857 • * ★ * 
7 -0.289177 -0.20085 • it it it it 
8 -0.313953 -0.21806 **** 
9 -0.023201 -0.01611 
10 -0.295298 -0.20510 ★ * ★ * 
11 -0.100551 -0.06984 ★ 
12 0.032011 0.02223 
13 -0.127216 -0.08836 ★ * 
14 -0.244947 -0.17013 it it it 
15 -0.110872 -0.07701 ★ * 
16 -0.010542 -0.00732 
17 0.040095 0.02785 * 
18 0.022363 0.01553 
19 -0.059748 -0.04150 * 
20 -0.025025 -0.01738 • 
(b) Partial Autocorrelation Function (PACF) 
Lag Correlation -1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 ( D1234567891 
1 0.38788 ********# 
2 0.03451 * 
3 0.01135 
4 0.03026 ★ 
5 -0.07427 ★ 
6 -0.15884 *★* 
7 -0.10203 ★ * 
8 -0.10335 it it 
9 0.15972 * ** 
10 -0.24839 ***** 
11 0.11474 ** 
12 0.04449 * 
13 -0.21490 ***★ 
14 -0.14930 *** 
15 0.05745 * 
16 -0.02822 * 
17 0.06091 * 
18 -0.07687 ★ * 
19 0.01751 
20 -0.13108 ** ★ 
Figure 8. ACF and PACF of the construction data series without differencing 
Analyzing the data with intervention modeling 
The first way that the data are employed in intervention analysis of 
this study was by conducting intervention modeling using four separate 
dummy variables, one for each model, to represent the intervals before 
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(coded ”0”) and after (coded ”1”). The results are presented in Table 11. 
The results show that none of the t-ratios of the parameter estimate 
is significant. The AIC of the estimation for the intervention modeling of 
Policy II is the smallest. 
Table 11. The results of analyzing the effect of each of four policy 
changes on the construction data series 
Policy I Policy II Policy III Policy IV 
t-ratioa - 0.09 1.29 0.81 - 0.50 
AIC 69.5843 68,4046 68.8922 69.3802 
Residual 
Chi-square 8.79 8.51 8.88 9.40 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.947 0.954 0.944 0.927 
aFor the intervention parameter. 
In terms of diagnostic checking, the residual chi-square values for 
Policy II is the smallest. This means that the modeling of this policy is 
conducted properly. However, because there is no significant t-ratio of 
parameter estimate of each policy, the conclusion is that no policy had a 
significant impact on the level of foreign investment in the construction 
sector. 
The second way in which the intervention modeling analysis was 
conducted was by using simultaneously all four dummy variables representing 
the four policies implemented. The results are presented in Table 12. 
The t-ratios show that there is a significant partial effect of Policy 
II. The t-ratio of Policy I is on the border line of significance. There 
is only one value for AIC, which cannot be compared directly with results 
from the other single-intervention models. The diagnostic residual 
checking gave a value of chi-square that is smaller than its critical 
value. This indicates that there is no autocorrelation remaining among the 
residuals, which means that the assumption of random residuals used in this 
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modeling is fulfilled and that the model was conducted properly. 
The conclusion is that, with this method of intervention modeling, 
Policy II is detected to have a significant partial effect on the level of 
foreign investment in the construction sector. Policy I is also found to 
have a slightly significant partial effect on this level of foreign 
investment. Policy I refers to the regulation following the incident of 
January 1974, and Policy II refers to the first formal implementation of 
the Investment Priority List. 
Table 12. The results of analyzing the simultaneous effect of all policies 
on the construction data series 
Policy I Policy II Policy III Policy IV 
t-ratioa - 1.94 2.50 1.11 - 1.07 
AICb 69.8345 
Residual ^ 
Chi-squareD 14.27 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.648 
aFor the intervention parameter. 
bThere is only one value for the simultaneous model. 
Analysis of Approved Foreign Investment in Trade and Hotels 
Plotting the data 
The next figure is the plot of approved foreign investment in trade 
and hotels. After going through ups and downs from 1970 to 1974, the level 
of approved foreign investment in trade and hotels decreased continually, 
with the exception of an increase in 1980, until 1982. Starting in 1983, 
the level of approved investment increased, then it decreased again, to 
zero in 1985 and 1986. The approved investment level increased 
subsequently in 1987, to the value of $196.0 million. The implementation 
of the 1986 package might be the reason for this increase. 
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Figure 9. Approved foreign investment in trade and hotels, 1970-1990 
Modeling the data with Univariate Time Series 
Without differencing, the ACF plot suggests an AR(1) model/ but the 
PACF is not clear. With one period of differencing, the ACF plot suggests 
an AR(1,1) model, but the PACF plot seems ambiguous. Both of the relevant 
ACF and PACF plots are not shown/ because we do not choose either one of 
those models as an optimal model. Estimation and diagnostic checking 
results as shown in Table 13 do not support either model mentioned above. 
Both of the t-ratios are not significant. Even though the AIC for d = 0 is 
better than when d = 1, we cannot choose AR(1) as a tentative model. The 
same thing happened with diagnostic checking. The value of chi-square for 
the residuals is smaller than the number of degrees of freedom/ when there 
is no differencing applied to the series/ and the probability of chi-square 
is greater in this case. However, this does not help in the decision 
possibly to choose AR(1) as a model, because its t-ratio is not significant 
at all. Due to that reason and because of evidence in the ACF and PACF 
(results not shown here), we employed an ARIMA (2,1,0) as a tentative 
model for the intervention modeling analysis. 
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Table 13. The results of parameter estimation and residual analysis 
of the trade and hotels data series 
No Differencing 
d = 0 
With Differencing 
d = 1 
t-ratioa 1.11 - 0.96 
AIC 87.9454 90.5998 
Residual 
Chi-square 6.32 12.95 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.991 0.740 
aFor the AR(1) parameter. 
Analyzing the data with intervention modeling 
The first way that the data are employed in intervention analysis of 
this study is by conducting intervention modeling using four separate dummy 
variables, one for each model, to represent the intervals before (coded 
"0”) and after (coded "1"). The results are presented in Table 14. 
The results show that the t-ratio of the parameter estimate is 
significant only for the effect of Policy IV. The AIC of the estimation 
for the intervention modeling of Policy IV is the smallest, compared to 
AICs of the other series. 
Table 14. The results of analyzing the effect of each of four policy 
changes on the trade and hotels data series 
Policy I Policy II Policy III Policy IV 
t-ratioa - 0.06 0.29 1.66 3.22 
AIC 89.9415 89.8442 87.0284 82.4833 
Residual 
Chi-square 6.21 6.54 8.21 11.06 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.992 0.989 0.962 0.854 
aFor the intervention parameter. 
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In terms of diagnostic checking, the chi-square value for Policy IV, 
with 0.854 probability, is less than its critical value. This means that 
the modeling of this policy is conducted properly. The conclusion is that 
Policy IV, which refers to the 1986 regulation, had an impact on the level 
of approved investment in the trade and hotels sector. 
The second way in which the intervention modeling analysis was 
conducted was by using simultaneously all four dummy variables representing 
the four policies implemented. The results are presented in Table 15. 
Table 15. The results of analyzing the simultaneous effect of all policies 
on the trade and hotels data series 
Policy I Policy II Policy III Policy IV 
t-ratioa - 0.55 0.29 0.84 - 0.06 
AICb 93.1670 
Residual ^ 
Chi-squareD 9.52 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.890 
For the intervention parameter. 
^There is only one value for the simultaneous model. 
The t-ratios show that there is no significant partial effect of any 
policy. There is only one value for AIC, which cannot be compared directly 
with results from the other single-intervention models. The diagnostic 
residual checking gave a value of chi-square that is about the same with 
its critical value. This indicates that there might be autocorrelation 
among the residuals, which means that the assumption of randomly 
distributed residuals is not fulfilled and the modeling was not conducted 
properly. However, the conclusion of no significant effect of any policy 
is appropriate from the t-ratio point of view, despite the possibility that 
the assumption of white noise residuals is not fulfilled. 
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Analysis of Approved Foreign Investment in 
Transportation and Communications 
Plotting the data 
Figure 10 shows the plot of approved foreign investment in the 
transportation and communications sector. Of the twenty-one data points, 
seven are zero. It is not clear, whether there is no foreign investment 
during those years, or whether there were no data recorded at that time. 
LTRANSCM 
7.5 =| 
5.0 = 
2.5 
0.0 = 
★ * * * 
* ★ * 
I960 1970 1980 1990 
YEAR 
Figure 10. Approved foreign investment in transportation and 
communications, 1970-1990 
In the first period, of 1970 until the mid-eighties, the level of 
approved foreign investment in this sector ranges between zero and $20 
million. In the late eighties, the level of approved foreign investment 
increased to $70 million, then rose to $213 million, and then dropped 
drastically to $2.5 million. This investment rose again to $803 million i 
1990. 
No pattern is found in this plot. The approved level of foreign 
investment in transportation and communications seems to be in a narrow 
range throughout the period, except for the three years mentioned above. 
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Modeling the data with Univariate Time Series 
Without differencing, the ACF plot suggests an AR(1) model, but the 
PACF is not clear. With one period of differencing, the ACF plot suggests 
an AR(1,1) model, but the PACF plot seems ambiguous. Both of these sets of 
ACF and PACF plots are not shown here, because we do not choose either one 
of these models as a tentative model. The estimation and diagnostic 
checking results as shown in Table 16 also do not support either model. 
Table 16. The results of parameter estimation and residual analysis 
of the transportation and communications data series 
No Differencing 
d = 0 
With Differencing 
d = 1 
t-ratioa 0.65 - 1.17 
AIC 88.9936 91.0042 
Residual 
Chi-square 10.06 14.85 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.901 0.606 
aFor the AR(1) parameter. 
Both of the two t-ratios are not significant. Even though the AIC of 
d = 0 is better than when d = 1, we cannot choose AR(1) as a tentative 
model. The same thing happened with diagnostic checking. The values of 
chi-square for the residuals are both less than their critical values. 
However, this does not help in the decision to choose AR(1) as a model, 
because the t-ratios are not significant at all. Due to that reason, and 
because of evidence in the ACF and PACF (results not shown here), we 
employed an ARIMA (2,1,0) as a tentative model for the intervention 
modeling analysis. 
Analyzing the data with intervention modeling 
The first way that the data are employed in intervention analysis of 
this data series is by conducting intervention modeling using four 
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separates dummy variables, one for each model, to represent the intervals 
before (coded "0") and after (coded "1”). The results are presented in 
Table 17. 
The results show that the t-ratio of the parameter estimate is 
significant only for the effect of Policy III. The AIC of the estimation 
for the intervention modeling of Policy III is the smallest, compared to 
AICs of the other series. 
Table 17. The results of analyzing the effect of each of four policy 
changes on the transportation and communications data series 
Policy I Policy II Policy III Policy IV 
t-ratioa - 0.01 0.71 3.55 1.47 
AIC 90.9936 90.3762 80.4041 89.1514 
Residual 
Chi-square 10.06 11.48 10.56 11.22 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.901 0.831 0.879 0.845 
aFor the intervention parameter. 
In terms of diagnostic checking, the chi-square value for Policy III, 
with 0.879 probability, is slightly less than its critical value. This 
means that the modeling of this policy is still conducted properly. The 
conclusion is that Policy III, which refers to the 1984 regulation, had an 
impact on the level of approved investment in the transportation and 
communications sector. 
The second way in which the intervention modeling analysis was 
conducted was by using simultaneously all four dummy variables representing 
the four policies implemented. The results are presented in Table 18. 
The t-ratios show that there is no significant partial effect of any 
policy. There is only one value for AIC, which cannot be compared directly 
with results from the other single-intervention models. 
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Table 18. The results of analyzing the simultaneous effect of all policies 
on the transportation and communications data series 
Policy I Policy II Policy III Policy IV 
t-ratioa - 1.32 1.20 0.86 - 0.67 
AICb 91.8806 
Residual ^ 
Chi-square 13.56 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.632 
aFor the intervention parameter. 
^There is only one value for the simultaneous model. 
The diagnostic residual checking gave a value of chi-square that is 
larger than its critical value. This indicates that there are some non¬ 
zero autocorrelations among the residuals, which means that the assumption 
of white-noise residuals is not fulfilled, and that the modeling was not 
conducted properly. Therefore, the conclusion that there is no policy 
which affected the level of this investment should be interpreted 
carefully. 
Analysis of Approved Foreign Investment in Services 
Plotting the data 
Figure 11 shows the plot of approved foreign investment in the 
services sector. The plot is very scattered, with large fluctuations 
between one observation and another. The level of approved investment in 
services was high in 1974, at the level of $140.7 million, then dropped 
drastically, to $9.5 million in 1975. The policy of 1974 might be 
responsible for this decrease. The Investment Priority List, which was 
implemented for the first time in 1977, put restrictions on the areas of 
services that were opened for foreign investors. The level of investment 
in services dropped from $20.3 million in 1977 to $4.4 million in 1978 
perhaps due to that reason. The May 6, 1986 package seems to have had an 
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Figure 11. Approved foreign investment in services, 1970-1990. 
impact on the level of investment in this sector. A sharp increase in the 
level of investment was recorded in the years following 1987. 
Modeling the data with Univariate Time Series 
From the identification analysis, the ACF and PACF plots are 
as shown in Figure 12. With one period of differencing, the ACF plot and 
PACF plot suggest an AR(1) model. Without differencing, the ACF plot and 
PACF plot do not support any particular model. These plots are not shown 
here. 
Estimation and diagnostic checking give the results as shown in 
Table 19. The t-ratio for the AR(1) parameter estimate with differencing 
is significant. The AIC is smaller when d = 1 than when d = 0. As a 
result, AR(1,1) is chosen as a tentative model. The chi-square value for 
the residuals with d = 1 is less than the chi-square value for the 
residuals when there is no differencing applied to the series. 
The probability that the autocorrelation of residuals equals zero is 
very substantial when first-differencing is used. These results support 
the choice of AR(1,1) as an optimal tentative model. 
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(a) Autocorrelation Function (ACF) 
Lag Covariance Correlation -198765432101234567891 
0 2.788628 1.00000 ******************** 
1 -1.743159 -0.62510 ************* 
2 1.190279 0.42683 # ★****★*★★ 
3 -0.697041 -0.24996 ***** # 
4 0.468741 0.16809 # *** 
5 -0.175791 -0.06304 * 
6 -0.108117 -0.03877 • * 
7 0.161437 0.05789 • * 
8 -0.486000 -0.17428 • * * * 
9 0.322293 0.11557 ★ ★ # 
10 -0.545371 -0.19557 ★ *** 
11 0.105676 0.03790 ★ # 
12 0.101363 0.03635 * 
13 0.062409 0.02238 
14 -0.160527 -0.05756 * 
15 0.038101 0.01366 
16 0.060340 0.02164 
17 0.022792 0.00817 
18 -0.010504 -0.00377 
19 -0.0012369 -0.00044 
(b) Partial Autocorrelation Function (PACF) 
Lag Correlation -19876543 2 1 ( D1234567891 
1 -0.62510 ************* 
2 0.05923 * 
3 0.06272 ★ 
4 0.03034 ★ # 
5 0.07379 * 
6 -0.09666 * ★ 
7 -0.03238 * 
8 -0.18737 ★ *** 
9 -0.12102 * * 
10 -0.16820 *★★ 
11 -0.25161 ***** 
12 0.04323 * 
13 0.21091 **** 
14 -0.00877 
15 -0.10701 * * 
16 -0.08496 * * 
17 -0.05085 * 
18 -0.09315 ★ * 
19 -0.11385 * * . 
(b) 
Figure 12. ACF and PACF of the services data series with differencing 
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Table 19. The results of parameter estimation and residual analysis 
of the services data series. 
No Differencing 
d = 0 
With Differencing 
d = 1 
t-ratioa 1.61 - 3.29 
AIC 77.3819 71.8026 
Residual 
Chi-square 17.12 9.24 
Probability 
of Chi-square 0.447 0.932 
aFor the AR(1) parameter. 
Analyzing the data with intervention modeling 
The first way that the data are employed in intervention analysis of 
this study is by conducting intervention modeling using four separate dummy 
variables, one for each model, to represent the intervals before (coded 
"0”) and after (coded "1"). The results are presented in Table 20. 
The results show that the t-ratio of the parameter estimate 
is significant only for the effect of Policy IV. The AIC of the 
estimation for the intervention modeling of Policy IV is the smallest. 
Table 20. The results of analyzing the effect of each of four policy 
changes on the services data series 
Policy I Policy II Policy III Policy IV 
t-ratioa - 0.36 -0.06 1.80 1.97 
AIC 79.2536 79.3787 76.6368 75.9437 
Residual 
Chi-square 15.85 16.84 17.59 13.13 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.535 0.465 0.415 0.727 
aFor the intervention parameter. 
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In terms of diagnostic checking, the chi-square value for Policy IV is 
the smallest, with the largest probability. This means that the modeling 
of this policy fulfills the assumption of random residuals. The conclusion 
is that Policy IV, which refers to the 1986 regulation, had an impact on 
the level of foreign investment in the services sector. 
The second way in which the intervention modeling analysis was 
conducted was by using simultaneously all four dummy variables representing 
the four policies implemented. The results are presented in Table 21. 
The t-ratios show that there is no significant partial effect of each 
policy. There is only one value for AIC, which cannot be compared directly 
with results from the other single-intervention models. The diagnostic 
residual checking gave a value of chi-square that is smaller than its 
critical value. This indicates that there is no autocorrelation remaining 
among the residuals, which means that the assumption of white noise 
residuals used in this modeling is fulfilled and that the modeling was 
conducted properly. The conclusion is that, with this method of 
intervention modeling, no policy among the four policies considered is 
detected to have a significant partial effect on the level of foreign 
investment in the services sector. 
Table 21. The 
on 
results of 
the services 
analyzing the 
data series 
simultaneous effect of all policies 
Policy I Policy II Policy III Policy IV 
t-ratioa - 0.64 0.43 0.45 0.26 
AICb 77.6752 
Residual 
Chi-squareD 8.05 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.966 
aFor the intervention parameter. 
bThere is only one value for the simultaneous model. 
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Analysis of Total Foreign Investment 
Plotting the data 
Figure 13 shows the plot of approved total foreign investment 
from 1967 to 1990. The plot seems to be pretty neat. The graph could be 
considered to be virtually a straight line with a positive slope. The 
increase in 1975 is caused primarily by the increase in the level of 
approved investment in manufacturing. As noted above, this increase is 
a little bit strange, because the policy of 1974 put more restrictions on 
foreign investments than before. 
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Figure 13. Total approved foreign investment, 1967-1990 
However, increase in the manufacturing sector during that time might also 
be applied to an explanation for the increase in the level of total 
approved foreign investment. 
The level of total investment decreased to $859 million in 1985, which 
might be related to the abolition of many incentives in 1984. On the other 
hand, total approved investment was increasing significantly and 
continually after the implementation of the 1986 deregulation package. 
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Modeling the data with Univariate Time Series 
From the identification analysis, the ACF plot and the PACF plot are 
as shown in Figure 14. Without differencing, the ACF plot and PACF plot 
suggest an AR(1) model. With one period of differencing, the ACF plot 
suggests an AR(1,1), but the PACF plot is not clear. 
(a) Autocorrelation Function (ACF) 
*ag Covariance Correlation -1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 ( D1234567891 
0 0.940587 1.00000 ******************** 
1 0.504095 0.53594 *********** 
2 0.261358 0.27787 # ★★**★★ * 
3 0.114036 0.12124 ★ * 
4 0.127120 0.13515 *** 
5 0.140579 0.14946 *** 
6 0.123299 0.13109 ★ ** 
7 0.062589 0.06654 * 
8 0.096034 0.10210 * * 
9 0.126937 0.13495 *** 
10 0.040711 0.04328 * 
11 -0.049042 -0.05214 ★ 
12 -0.266859 -0.28372 ****** 
13 -0.092884 -0.09875 ★ ★ 
14 -0.044898 -0.04773 * 
15 -0.039904 -0.04242 ★ 
16 -0.131224 -0.13951 
17 -0.148432 -0.15781 ★ * * 
18 -0.162752 -0.17303 ★ * * 
19 -0.176602 -0.18776 ★ * * * 
(b) Partial Autocorrelation Function (PACF) 
Lag Correlation -1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 ( D1234567891 
1 0.53594 *********** 
2 -0.01313 
3 -0.03171 # * 
4 0.11972 ★ * 
5 0.05398 * 
6 0.00993 
7 -0.03165 ★ 
8 0.10104 * * 
9 0.05635 * 
10 -0.12357 • * * 
11 -0.07320 # * 
12 -0.30749 # ****** 
13 0.26618 ***** 
14 -0.08218 • ** 
15 -0.06548 # ★ 
16 -0.07806 • ** 
17 -0.01746 
18 -0.04936 # ★ 
19 -0.14935 # * * ★ 
• i 
Figure 14. ACF and PACF of the total approved foreign investment 
data series without differencing 
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Estimation and diagnostic checking give the result as shown in Table 22. 
The t-ratio for the AR(1) parameter estimate without differencing is very 
significant. However, the AIC is smaller when d = 1 than when d = 0. Yet, 
an AR(1) was still chosen as the tentative model. 
Table 22. The results of parameter estimation and residual analysis 
of the total approved investment data series 
No Differencing 
d = 0 
With Differencing 
d = 1 
t-ratioa 5.25 - 1.10 
AIC 56.2482 51.2534 
Residual 
Chi-square 12.68 14.42 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.757 0.637 
aFor the AR(1) parameter. 
The chi-square value for the residuals with d = 0 is less than the 
chi-square value for the residuals when there is differencing applied to 
the series. The probability that the autocorrelation of residuals equals 
zero is larger when there is no differencing used. This leads to the 
finding that the assumption of white noise residuals, which is used in this 
modeling, is fulfilled. Based on the results of the estimation and 
diagnostic checking, AR(1) is chosen as an optimal model. 
Analyzing the data with intervention modeling 
The first way that the data are employed in intervention analysis is 
by conducting intervention modeling using four separate dummy variables, 
one for each model, to represent the intervals before (coded "0") and after 
(coded "1"). The results are presented in Table 23. 
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Table 23. The results of analyzing the effect of each of four policy 
changes on the total approved investment data series 
Policy I Policy II Policy III Policy IV 
t-ratioa - 1.72 3.16 1.77 3.03 
AIC 56.2520 49.6324 56.9468 52.0406 
Residual 
Chi-square 11.16 13.61 14.91 11.14 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.848 0.694 0.602 0.849 
aFor the intervention parameter. 
The results show that the t-ratios of the parameter estimate are 
significant for the effect of Policy II and Policy IV. The AIC of the 
estimation for the intervention modeling of Policy II is the smallest, 
followed by the AIC of Policy IV as the second smallest. 
In terms of diagnostic checking, the chi-square value of Policy IV is 
the smallest, with the largest probability. This means that the modeling 
of this policy is the best at fulfilling the assumption of a random 
distribution of residuals. 
The conclusion is that Policy II and Policy IV, which refer to the 
first formal announcement of the Investment Priority List in 1977, and the 
1986 regulation, respectively, had an impact on the level of total approved 
foreign investment. 
The second way in which the intervention modeling analysis was 
conducted was by using the simultaneously all four dummy variables 
representing the four policies implemented. The results are presented in 
Table 24. 
The t-ratios show that there are two significant partial effects, from 
Policy II and Policy IV. There is only one value for AIC, which cannot be 
compared directly with results from the other single-intervention models. 
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Table 24. The results of analyzing the simultaneous effect of all policies 
on the total approved investment data series. 
Policy I Policy II Policy III Policy IV 
t-ratioa - 1.33 3.26 0.14 2.30 
AICb 46.9619 
Residual b 
Chi-squareD 13.35 
Prob. of 
Chi-square 0.712 
aFor the intervention parameter. 
°There is only one value for the simultaneous model. 
The diagnostic residual checking gave a value of chi-square that is 
slightly smaller than its critical value. This indicates that there is no 
autocorrelation remaining among the residuals, which means that the 
assumption of white noise residuals used in this modeling is fulfilled and 
that the modeling was conducted properly. The conclusion is that, Policy 
II and Policy IV are detected to have significant partial effects on the 
level of total approved foreign investment. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Two methods of intervention modeling are applied in this analysis. 
The results of the two methods in some sectors are different. 
For the agriculture, forestry, and fishery sector, for example, the 
1984 policy is found to have a positive impact on the level of investment. 
This means that the implementation of that policy has a partial significant 
effect that led to the increasing level of approved foreign investment in 
this sector. Therefore, the fact that the 1984 policy is the policy that 
includes the abolition of incentives to foreign investors, is not found to 
have a negative effect on foreign investment. However, the plot of 
approved foreign investment in this sector shows that there is a decrease 
in the level of foreign investment after 1984. 
The results mentioned above are findings from both methods applied in 
the intervention modeling conducted in this analysis. The effect of the 
1984 policy, measured by the first method, is more significant than the 
findings from the second method. 
In the mining sector, the Investment Priority List regulation of 1977 
and the 1984 policy are both found to have significant partial effects on 
the level of approved foreign investment. In this case, the effects are 
negative, which means that the two policies are responsible for decreasing 
the level of foreign investment in this sector in the years following their 
implementation. The 1974 policy, which was considered to be the cause of 
the decreasing level of investment after 1974, is not found to have a 
significant effect on this investment series. These findings are from the 
first method of intervention modeling. The second method of intervention 
modeling gives the finding that there is no significant partial effect of 
each of the four policies on the level of foreign investment in the mining 
sector. 
In the case of the manufacturing sector, both methods of intervention 
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modeling give the same results, which are that the Investment Priority List 
policy of 1977 and the 1986 policy have impacts on the level of foreign 
investment in manufacturing. This means that both policies are partially 
responsible for the increase in the level of foreign investment after their 
implementation. Therefore, the effort to regulate foreign investment by 
using the Investment Priority List did not discourage foreign investors. 
The deregulation of 1986 is found to have an impact, as expected, which was 
intended to attract foreign investment activity. As is shown in the plot 
of foreign investment, the 1974 policy is not found to have an effect on 
investment in the manufacturing sector. 
For the construction sector, no significant effect is found from the 
first method of intervention modeling. With the second method, the policy 
of 1974 and the policy of 1977 are found to have negative effects on the 
level of foreign investment in this sector, especially with the Investment 
Priority List regulation of 1977. As is shown in the plot of foreign 
investment, the 1984 policy and the 1986 policy are also not found to have 
any effect on this investment. 
In the trade and hotels sector, only the 1986 policy is found to have 
a positive significant partial effect on the investment series, as a result 
of the first method of intervention modeling. This implies that the 
increase in the level of foreign investment in this sector after 1986, as 
shown in the plot, is due to the 1986 deregulation policy. By using the 
second method, no significant effect is found regarding the policies 
implemented. 
For the transportation and communications sector, the policy of 1984 
is detected to have a positive impact on the level of foreign investment in 
this sector. With the second method, the result is that there is no 
significant effect of any policy on the level of foreign investment in the 
transportation and communications sector. 
In the services sector, the finding is that the 1986 regulation has a 
positive significant partial effect on its level of foreign investment. 
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The 1974 policy and the 1977 policy, which are considered to be responsible 
for the decrease in the level of foreign investment after their 
implementation, are found to have no significant effect on that. By using 
the second method of intervention modeling, the result is that no policy 
has a significant effect. 
Finally, with both methods of intervention modeling, it is found that 
the Policy of 1977 and the Policy of 1986 have positive effects on the 
level of total approved foreign investment. However, no impact is detected 
from the implementation of the 1974 policy or the 1984 policy. Therefore, 
there is no evidence that the decrease of approved foreign investment in 
1985 is due to the implementation of the 1984 policy. 
Based on the results above, the conclusion is that each policy has a 
different impact on the level of foreign investment in each sector. In 
addition, the policies which are considered to discourage foreign 
investments, such as the 1974 policy and the 1984 policy, do not always 
have such negative effects. On the other hand, policies which are expected 
to attract foreign investment, such as the 1986 policy, are found to have 
an immediate positive impact in some sectors, as expected, and no negative 
effect is found due to the implementation of this policy. However, the 
1977 policy has an ambiguous effect that might be due to the nature of this 
policy. This policy is intended to promote investment, by listing the 
sectors that are opened for investment, but, on the other hand, this policy 
put restrictions on some sectors by closing particular sectors from foreign 
investment. Therefore, for some sectors, the Investment Priority List of 
1977 gives positive effects, but for the other sectors it gives negative 
effects. 
These findings support the view of one scholar, as it is presented in 
the literature review, that the effect of government policy sometimes is 
arbitrary (Grosse, 1980). Furthermore, some scholars in the literature 
review also argued that the "environment" is the most important factor in 
the effort to attract foreign investment (Lall and Streeten, 1977). The 
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finding that a policy that is considered to be a "positive" change 
sometimes even gives no effect, or that a "negative" policy could lead to a 
positive effect for a sector supports those arguments. In each case, the 
"environment" might be not supportive or might be encouraging, 
respectively, thus reducing the positive effect of a "positive" policy, or 
eliminating the negative effect of a "negative" policy. These results 
might also be related to the meaning of "correct" or "not correct" policy 
as implied in Lall's argument (1981), which means that a "negative" policy 
might be the correct policy for a particular sector. On the other hand, a 
"positive" policy could be an incorrect policy that does not give the 
expected result, as implied by Luger and Shetty's argument (1985) that the 
relationship between incentives and foreign investment is not always 
significantly positive. The finding that a "restriction" policy does not 
always discourage foreign investment, is contrary to the implication of the 
argument in the literature review that this kind of policy will always 
discourage foreign investments. 
However, the fact that the number of data values is less than 50 
should be taken into consideration when we interpret the results of this 
analysis. Besides, the large lag interval between observations, which is 
one year, produces high standard errors, large sample variation, and poor 
parameter estimation. As a result, in some sectors there are no 
significant effects detected due to the implementation of some policies, or 
less significance of the effects, owing to those data problems. 
The results of this study lead to some suggestions to the government 
of Indonesia in dealing with policies and regulations of foreign 
investment, as follows: 
1. In order to attract foreign investment, policies that attracts foreign 
investment should be implemented. This suggestion is based on the 
finding that a policy which is expected to invite foreign investment, 
such as the 1986 policy, does have a positive significant effect on the 
level of total approved foreign investment and on investment in some 
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sectors, including the manufacturing sector, which is the largest 
component of the quantity of foreign investment. Even though not all 
sectors have the same effects due to the implementation of this 
policy, none of the sectors has a decreasing effect that is caused by 
this policy. Therefore, at least this kind of policy prevents the 
decrease of investment in all sectors. 
2. If needed, for example, to promote or protect domestic investment and 
to control foreign investment, government could implement a kind of 
restriction policy for foreign investment, insofar as the intention 
of the government is to balance the proportion between foreign 
investment and domestic investment and to make sure that foreign 
investors do not misuse the privileges or incentives given, but invest 
in a business-like way. This suggestion is based on the finding that 
some kinds of restriction policies, such as the 1974 policy and the 1977 
policy, do not always have negative effects on the level of foreign 
investment. However, this restriction policy should be the "correct” 
one, which means that the policy is really needed for a particular 
sector and that the policy is well-prepared and based on appropriate 
research. 
3. In preparing the policy, the nature of each sector should be taken into 
consideration together with the record of investment prior to the 
implementation of the policy. Sectors that have small probabilities to 
attract foreign investment, as indicated by prior records, should be 
encouraged to attract foreign investment by implementing policies that 
offer incentives for foreign investment in those sectors. On the other 
hand, sectors that have already attracted foreign investment and that 
have high levels of foreign investment could be regulated with some kind 
of restrictive policies, if needed. 
4. In order for the suggestions mentioned above to be able to work well, 
a positive "environment," which means supportive political and 
economic conditions, is needed. In addition, the staffs who are in 
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charge of executing the policy should be capable and well-informed 
about the intention of the policy and the way the policy should be 
implemented to attract foreign investment. Furthermore, the policy 
should be stable, which means that the policy does not change all the 
time due to one reason or another. Therefore, careful thought and 
appropriate research should be the basis for all policy-making 
decisions. 
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APPENDIX 
APPROVED FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN INDONESIA, BY SECTOR 
(in Billions of dollar) 
Sector 
Agriculture, forestry, Mining Manufacturing 
and fishery 
101.2 75.0 
28.0 
50.0 
75.0 
143.0 
25.1 80.0 249.1 
57.4 175.0 215.5 
69.0 0 471.1 
52.8 69.0 1,124.6 
20.1 507.2 1,159.2 
34.8 10.9 346.8 
52.6 200.5 327.4 
58.3 38.1 280.8 
96.9 350.0 1,497.6 
64.7 3.0 761.9 
107.2 44.8 726.0 
44.4 0 1,120.0 
37.2 0 2,615.2 
0.2 0 1,001.7 
20.5 0 687.3 
129.8 0 536.7 
133.3 0 852.3 
79.7 0 3,828.0 
173.1 0 4,246.1 
191.6 115.5 5,646.9 
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Sector 
Construction Trade 
and Hotels 
Transportation 
and communications 
9.4 3.6 0.5 
6.0 51.8 4.2 
14.5 33.5 3.0 
14.6 28.4 15.2 
26.8 80.9 3.0 
8.6 21.3 20.3 
1.8 13.1 4.2 
0.8 7.0 0 
5.4 9.7 0 
0.5 3.0 0.2 
7.7 38.6 25.0 
48.8 0 0 
11.0 17.0 0 
43.5 78.0 0 
17.0 84.0 4.2 
122.3 0 0 
64.7 0 70.0 
42.2 196.0 213.0 
2.4 404.6 2.5 
15.9 97.8 4.5 
76.8 874.4 803.0 
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Sector 
Services Total Approved Investment 
125.0 
230.0 
682.0 
12.2 344.9 
9.9 426.1 
23.3 522.2 
56.5 655.4 
140.7 1,497.8 
9.5 1,746.2 
27.2 438.8 
20.3 608.6 
4.4 396.7 
45.3 1,993.5 
0 900.9 
7.6 934.4 
0 1,396.6 
106.3 2,882.2 
0 1,107.1 
0 859.0 
0 826.2 
0 1,457.1 
74.5 4,434.5 
66.6 4,718.8 
901.7 8,750.1 
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